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Bankrupt. The state or condition of one who is unable to pay his debts 
as they . . . become due.1
 
 
Over-appropriated. [A] condition of water allocation in which the 
quantity of surface water available during a specified period is not 
sufficient to meet the expected demands from all water rights [during 
a specified percentage of time] during that period.2
  INTRODUCTION   
 
Many western states are on the verge of bankruptcy, with 
debts exceeding assets. And yet, they continue to take on addi-
tional debt through contracts and other commitments.3 Re-
markably, in some cases the states cannot even calculate their 
debts and expenditures with precision.4
 
 1. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 134 (5th ed. 1979). 
 Although this distress 
sounds like an outgrowth of the 2008 recession, this crisis in-
 2. OR. ADMIN. R. § 690-400-0010(11)(a)(A) (2000) (based on insufficient 
supply at least 20% of the time). The Oregon Allocation Policy also defines 
“over-appropriated” with respect to groundwater as “a condition of water allo-
cation in which . . . [t]he appropriation of groundwater resources by all water 
rights exceeds the average annual recharge to a groundwater source over the 
period of record or results in the further depletion of already over-
appropriated surface waters.” Id. § 690-400-0010(11)(a)(B); see also id. § 690-
410-0070(1) (asserting the policy that “[t]he waters of the state shall be pro-
tected from over-appropriation by new out-of-stream uses of surface water or 
new uses of groundwater”). 
 3. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SUSTAINABLE WATER AND ENVI-
RONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN THE CALIFORNIA BAY-DELTA 33 (2012), availa-
ble at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=13394. 
 4. See infra Part III.D.2; see also State Water Res. Control Bd., Notice of 
Public Workshop: Water Diversion Measurement, CAL. ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY (June 9, 2011), http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/ 
programs/diversion_use/docs/workshop2011july/not_wdm070111.pdf. 
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volves water, not money. The states, as debtors, have 
overappropriated their water resources. As an official in one of 
the West’s most water-bankrupt states, California, complains, 
“[w]e annually use more water than nature provides” and con-
tinue to “sign water contracts . . . that, on their face, appear to 
promise [that the state will guarantee to continue these deliv-
eries].”5 He describes the debate over water supply as “a mirror 
image of our national and state budget battles” and argues, “[i]f 
borrowing money ultimately has to stop, so too must the end-
less [state] promises to deliver water, without regard for the 
consequences. We are running up against the practical limita-
tions of supply, and have little way to meet all the de-
mands . . . .”6
California is not alone in its struggle with over-promised 
water supplies. In fact, the challenge of water shortage extends 
far beyond the borders of the United States. In 2009, the World 
Economic Forum reported that the world is headed toward “wa-
ter bankruptcy,” with demand far outstripping supply.
  
7 As 
stated by the World Economic Forum, “[the world] simply can-
not manage water in the future as we have in the past or the 
economic web will collapse.”8
In the United States, numerous water administrators in 
the West routinely issue what are colloquially known as “paper 
water rights”—permits that suggest, often unrealistically, that 
a certain volume of water will be available for appropriation, at 
least for a significant portion of the time.
  
9
 
 5. PHIL ISENBERG, CHAIR, DELTA STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, ACHIEVING 
THE CO-EQUAL GOALS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 3, 8 (2011), available at 
http://www.deltacouncil.ca.gov/get-document/4291.pdf. 
 The West generally 
 6. Id. at 3. 
 7. WORLD ECON. FORUM, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM WATER INITIATIVE: 
MANAGING OUR FUTURE WATER NEEDS FOR AGRICULTURE, INDUSTRY, HUMAN 
HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 5 (Draft for Discussion at World Economic 
Forum Annual Meeting 2009). According to the report: 
In many places around the world, we have consistently under-priced 
water, wasting and overusing it as a result. We have depleted stocks 
of groundwater at the expense of our future water needs. In effect, we 
have enjoyed a series of regional water “bubbles” to support economic 
growth over the past 50 years or so, especially in agriculture. We are 
now on the verge of water bankruptcy in many places with no way of 
paying the debt back. In fact, a number of these regional water bub-
bles are now bursting in parts of China, the Middle East, the south-
western U.S. and India. 
Id. 
 8. Id.  
 9. See Planning & Conservation League v. Dep’t of Water Res., 83 Cal. 
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adheres to the “prior appropriation doctrine,” and allocates wa-
ter under the principle of “first in time, first in right.”10 The 
oldest water rights, dating back to the mid-nineteenth century 
in some watersheds,11 lock up a significant portion of the water 
supply in perpetuity.12 The supply is stretched further by 
drought, fluctuating precipitation patterns, and climate 
change.13 As a consequence, it can be difficult to accommodate 
emerging societal values—including environmental protection 
and recreation—unless the new users can come up with enough 
money to buy out their predecessors.14
Overall, there is an increasing recognition that the solution 
lies in reallocating some of the water supply to support critical 
values, such as environmental preservation and the prevention 
of species extinction. Bedrock principles of water law—
including the requirement of “beneficial use” and the public 
trust doctrine
 In short, the rules of the 
game were set well over a century before we fully appreciated 
the importance of saving some water for the natural environ-
ment and for other nonconsumptive uses. 
15—support reallocation. But any such attempt 
runs up against fierce resistance from those who hold the oldest 
water rights and who are entitled to protection under the con-
cept of priority, a competing core principle of water law.16 In a 
titanic struggle for dominance between those foundational con-
cepts, priority has been losing ground.17
 
App. 4th 892, 913–15 (2000) (noting the “aura of unreality” surrounding paper 
water rights and describing their value, in some cases, as worth “little more 
than a wish and a prayer”); see also infra Part I.B. 
 But it has been doing 
so outside the context of traditional state water institutions. 
Rather, priority has been giving way as frustrated stakeholders 
engage in voluntary, collaborative negotiations to find a new 
 10. See infra Part I.A. 
 11. See Concerning the Recognition of Acequias, and, in Connection 
Therewith, Authorizing Acequia Ditch Corporations, ch. 168, 2009 Colo. Sess. 
Laws 739 (2009) (“The oldest water right in Colorado is attributed to the San 
Luis People’s Ditch, with a priority date of April 10, 1852.”); Lux v. Haggin, 10 
P. 674 (Cal. 1886), superseded by rule as stated in Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. 
All Parties & Persons, 47 Cal. 2d 597 (1957) (recognizing appropriative rights 
in California); Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882) (recognizing 
appropriative rights in Colorado). 
 12. See also infra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 13. See 2009 Colo. Sess. Laws iii, vii. 
 14. See also infra Part I.C.1. 
 15. See infra Part I.A. 
 16. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 17. See infra Part I.C.2. 
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way to stretch precious water supplies.18 Bargaining in the 
shadow of the priority doctrine, numerous watershed groups 
have convened throughout the West.19 But collaborative efforts 
are not a panacea, and stakeholders face a new set of challeng-
es and questions. Most importantly, if the limitations of priori-
ty have prompted some stakeholders to move beyond tradition-
al dispute resolution mechanisms, what concepts should fill the 
void? With considerable effort, these groups have developed 
varying ad hoc processes to guide their negotiations.20 They 
have reinvented the wheel time and again, adjusted for the 
unique circumstances of their watersheds.21 But unease re-
mains, as collaborators struggle to harmonize their common 
history of priority allocation with the possibility of reallocation 
and shared sacrifice.22
In short, collaborators are in desperate need of a consistent 
conceptual framework to guide their efforts. To accommodate 
both the rhetoric of priority and the reality of reallocation, this 
Article develops the new concept of “water bankruptcy.” In so 
doing, this piece draws on the mechanisms and principles of 
federal bankruptcy law, a regime comfortable with both priori-
ty-based claims and shared loss. Just as traditional bankruptcy 
law provides a time-tested, comprehensive, and well-reasoned 
model that gives debtors a fresh start under dire circumstanc-
es, so too might water bankruptcy assist states in restructuring 
debts and reallocating assets related to society’s most precious, 
life-sustaining, and irreplaceable resource. And just as insol-
vent corporations and individuals emerge financially healthier 
from financial bankruptcy, so also might healthier watersheds 
result from water bankruptcy proceedings. 
 
 
 18. See World Heads for “Water Bankruptcy,” Says Davos Report, AFP, 
(Jan. 30, 2009), http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gw8a 
FWD0HjsLXr1cBCf4HlI079zg (last visited Nov. 3, 2012) (quoting Indra Nooyi, 
chairman and chief executive of PepsiCo, Inc., who asserted at the 2009 World 
Economic Forum, “[t]he only way to measurably and sustainably improve this 
dire situation is through broad-scale collaborative efforts between govern-
ments, industry, academic, and other stakeholders around the world”). 
 19. See infra note 223 and accompanying text. 
 20. See, e.g., 2011 Action Agenda Update: Strategy Development Points of 
Contact, PUGET SOUND PARTNERSHIP (Aug. 22, 2011), http://www 
.mypugetsound.net/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=175&
Itemid=172. 
 21. See, e.g., Watershed Issues, CINEGA WATERSHIP PARTNERSHIP, 
http://www.cienega.org/watershed-issues/#water (last visited Nov. 3, 2012). 
 22. See id. 
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Part I presents an overview of the prior appropriation doc-
trine and argues that the concept of priority is at the breaking 
point, no longer able to allocate water reliably under all cir-
cumstances. Overall, the system makes too many promises, but 
too few actual deliveries of water, driving some water users to 
the bargaining table. 
Part II surveys the broad range of tools that states current-
ly employ to stretch insufficient water supplies, sometimes con-
stituting an implicit reallocation that departs from strict priori-
ty. Adding to the existing literature, this Part attempts a 
comprehensive cataloguing of state techniques, and aligns 
them along a logical continuum that considers who bears the 
cost of reallocation. At one end of the sequence lay the seniors 
pay options—methods by which administrators cut back senior 
water rights to provide water for emerging societal values such 
as recreation and environmental protection.23
Finally, Part III introduces the new concept of “water 
bankruptcy.” By drawing an analogy to the well-developed 
principles of bankruptcy law, this Article offers a systematic, 
regularized way of thinking about a collection of place-specific, 
sui generis processes independently springing up across the 
West. Reducing the need for collaborators to invent a process 
and rationale anew in each case, this Article offers a common 
vocabulary and framework to encourage the development of an 
inter-state knowledge base of best practices for collaborative 
processes. In particular, this section looks to Chapter 9 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, which provides a “fresh start” for insolvent 
municipalities by allowing them to develop a plan for reorgani-
zation that readjusts the debts that they owe. The discussion 
recognizes the similarity of municipal insolvency and the 
states’ overallocation of water resources. Like western water 
 These tools tend 
to emphasize the public aspect of water. They depend on en-
forcement of the beneficial use, reasonable use, and public trust 
doctrines—fundamental principles that restrict water rights to 
the efficient, non-wasteful, beneficial uses of a common re-
source. At the other end of the continuum, the juniors pay op-
tions call for new users to buy out, compensate, or otherwise 
yield to older water uses. These options stress the private as-
pect of water and its status as a property right. This Part iden-
tifies the conditions under which each set of tools work well, 
and the circumstances under which each falls short. 
 
 23. See infra Part II.A. 
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law, bankruptcy is grounded in principles of priority. But un-
like water law, bankruptcy explicitly permits a departure from 
strict priority when circumstances so warrant. Bankruptcy’s 
“reset button” recognizes that other social values—such as sav-
ing debtors from ruin and allowing them to hold back the assets 
necessary for their survival—can sometimes affect creditors’ 
expectations of payment. Likewise, water bankruptcy would 
mediate the law’s internal struggle between beneficial use and 
priority and allow state water managers to bring back over-
stressed aquatic systems from the brink of collapse. 
Notably, this Article is not advocating the widespread re-
placement of state administration with stakeholder consensus, 
or the wholesale replacement of priority with shared loss. Rath-
er, this Article draws on principles of traditional bankruptcy to 
provide a systematic framework for willing collaborators who 
have voluntarily turned to negotiation, rather than traditional 
judicial or administrative processes, to resolve their water con-
flicts.  
I.  THE PRIOR APPROPRIATION DOCTRINE AND 
SCARCITY   
A. THE DOCTRINE 
The law of water allocation is primarily state law. State 
constitutions and statutes assert broad authority over water as 
a public resource to be administered for the benefit of all the 
people.24 States allocate to individuals only a “usufructuary” 
right—permission to use a specified quantity of water for a spe-
cific purpose.25 The states retain ultimate ownership or control 
over the water resources within their borders.26 As such, water 
rights are a unique type of personal property, neither purely 
private, nor purely public.27
 
 24. DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 74–77, 85 (3d ed. 
1997) [hereinafter GETCHES, NUTSHELL]. 
 
 25. CHRISTINE A. KLEIN, FEDERICO CHEEVER & BRET C. BIRDSONG, NAT-
URAL RESOURCES LAW: A PLACE-BASED BOOK OF PROBLEMS AND CASES 843–
45, 859–60 (2d ed. 2009). 
 26. See id. 
 27. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN 235 (1992) 
[hereinafter WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN] (“All [western] state 
constitutions or statutes declared water to be public, but nearly all water was 
appropriated for private gain. Even superficially public uses had heavy private 
overtones. The crusades of Los Angeles, Denver, Phoenix, and Albuquerque for 
water in fact have been mainly the crusades of forward-looking land develop-
ers who had staked out subdivisions on the plains and deserts and who needed 
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The prior appropriation doctrine dominates in the states 
bisected by, or west of, the hundredth meridian—the longitudi-
nal line that passes through North Dakota, South Dakota, Ne-
braska, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas.28 In general, water us-
ers must satisfy three requirements before they acquire vested 
water rights under the appropriation doctrine.29 First, they 
must demonstrate a firm intent to appropriate the unappropri-
ated waters of a natural source.30 Ill-formed plans can be dis-
missed as mere speculation rather than firm intent,31 and over-
utilized watersheds may be deemed insufficient to satisfy the 
reasonable expectations created by the grant of a new water 
right.32 Next, they must physically divert water from its natural 
source to the place of use, which may be in a distant watershed 
or even across a mountain range.33 Finally, users must put the 
water to beneficial use without waste.34
Among the three elements, beneficial use has been recog-
nized as the core requirement—what some states refer to as 
“the basis, the measure, and the limit of the right.”
  
35 Tradition-
ally, beneficial uses included putting water to work for domes-
tic, mining, agricultural, and manufacturing purposes.36
 
ample and reliable municipal water supplies to complete their ventures.”); 
Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Water as a Public Commodity, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 17, 
17–18 (2011) (conceptualizing water as a “public commodity” to harmonize the 
visions of water as commodity, public trust, and human right). 
 In 
modern times, courts recognize as beneficial such additional 
uses as scenic enjoyment, recreation, and environmental pro-
tection. As the Idaho Supreme Court explained in 1974:  
 28. KLEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 843–44. Nine states (Alaska, Arizona, 
Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming) follow a 
“pure” version of the doctrine and nine other western states (California, Kan-
sas, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, and 
Washington) recognize a hybrid appropriation/riparian doctrine in which ap-
propriation dominates. DOUGLAS L. GRANT & GREGORY S. WEBER, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON WATER LAW 7 (8th ed. 2010). 
 29. GETCHES, NUTSHELL, supra note 24, at 74. 
 30. Id. at 89. 
 31. See Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs of Arapahoe v. Crystal Creek Homeown-
ers’ Ass’n, 14 P.3d 325, 333 (Colo. 2000) (discussing the “can and will” doctrine 
set forth in COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(9)(b) (2000)). 
 32. Id. (recognizing that applications for conditional water rights can be 
dismissed for failure to demonstrate sufficient quantities of water available for 
appropriation). 
 33. GETCHES, NUTSHELL, supra note 24, at 92–97.  
 34. Id. at 24, 97–100. 
 35. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.035 (Lexis-Nexis 2012); NEW 
MEX. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-2 (West 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-3 (1989). 
 36. GETCHES, NUTSHELL, supra note 24, at 97. 
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[I]f we were now presented with a question of whether or not using 
water to operate a public swimming pool, a fountain, or to flood a 
tract to provide ice for a skating rink were beneficial uses, a good ar-
gument could be presented that such uses, although not [recognized 
by the traditional common law] were nevertheless beneficial. But we 
cannot say that such uses will always be beneficial because conditions 
might so change that these uses would be an unjustifiable use of wa-
ter needed for other purposes. . . . [T]here is always a possibility 
that . . . uses beneficial in one era will not be in another and vice ver-
sa.37
Thus, the contours of beneficial use evolve over time to accom-
modate changed circumstances. 
 
Increasingly, these common-law requirements have been 
modified by statute. The diversion requirement has been re-
laxed or eliminated,38 and many states now recognize non-
diversionary “instream flow” water rights to keep water in 
place to protect the natural environment.39 Most states have 
added a public interest test to the traditional triad of common-
law requirements.40 Furthermore, the common-law appropria-
tion system itself has been supplanted by administrative per-
mit systems in virtually every western state.41 Colorado re-
mains the lone exception where users do not need to secure an 
administrative permit before making a valid appropriation of 
water. Instead, water users in Colorado put water to beneficial 
use first, and then go to trial courts known as “water courts” to 
demonstrate their compliance with the law and to receive de-
crees granting them water rights with specific priority dates.42
As its name indicates, the prior appropriation doctrine re-
wards those who come first.
 
43
 
 37. Idaho Dep’t of Parks v. Idaho Dep’t of Water Admin., 530 P.2d 924, 
931–32 (Idaho 1974) (Bakes, J., concurring). 
 That is, unlike riparian water us-
 38. See J. Vincent Jones, The Bean Lake Saga: The End of the Diversion 
Requirement in Pre-1973 Water Appropriation Claims in Montana, 7 GREAT 
PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 64, 68 (2003) (discussing this in the context of 
Montana). 
 39. Charlton H. Bonham, Perspectives from the Field: A Review of Western 
Instream Flow Issues and Recommendations for a New Water Future, 36 
ENVTL. L. 1205, 1207 (2006). See generally Symposium, Western Instream 
Flows: Fifty Years of Progress and Setbacks, 36 ENVTL. L. 1 (2006) (examining 
the development of instream flow rights and obstacles to their implementa-
tion, the interplay of federal and tribal instream flow protection with state wa-
ter law, and innovative approaches for the future of instream rights; each au-
thor discusses the issue of instream rights from his or her area of specialty). 
 40. KLEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 860, 872–73. 
 41. GETCHES, NUTSHELL, supra note 24, at 7, 88–89. 
 42. KLEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 860. 
 43. GETCHES, NUTSHELL, supra note 24, at 78. 
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ers in the East who share the loss in times of shortage, western 
appropriators exercise their water rights in order of temporal 
priority. The person who made the first appropriation from a 
particular watercourse—known as the senior water user—may 
satisfy her water right in full before so-called junior appropria-
tors receive a single drop of water.44
B. TOO MANY PROMISES, TOO LITTLE WATER 
  
The appropriation system’s reliance on the principle of first 
come, first served has produced a curious semantic distinction. 
In water parlance, the phrase “paper water rights” refers to the 
newest entitlements. These rights are so junior that it is rarely 
their turn to receive water. In dry years—or even in average 
years—the last users in line may not receive any water at all.45 
In contrast, only the more reliable senior water rights are ca-
pable of consistently yielding the legal right to “wet water.”46 It 
is true that even the most junior water rights may allow their 
holders to fill reservoirs or recharge aquifers in rare years of 
abundance.47 Nevertheless, the practice of overappropriation 
encourages an optimistically skewed perception of the suffi-
ciency of existing water supplies.48 As a result, for example, 
planners might be tempted to approve more development than 
the existing water supply can support reliably.49 As the Califor-
nia Court of Appeals explained, “[t]hus, where land use plan-
ning determinations can be made on the basis of entitlement 
rather than real water, development can outpace the availabil-
ity of water, leading to detrimental environmental consequenc-
es, excessive groundwater pumping, and pressure to develop 
additional water supplies.”50
 
 44. Id. at 101. 
 Overall, the prevalence of oxymo-
 45. KLEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 860, 872–73. 
 46. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN, supra note 27, at 240 
(“What if the stream were already fully appropriated? Grant the permit any-
way; give the junior a ‘paper right.’ The juniors will not get any wet water, ex-
cept in an unusually high year, but they need priority status in case they get 
together and have a dam built. Thus, the mission of the water agencies was to 
serve the bidding of the rights holders . . . . [G]overnment was enlisted purely 
to solidify private rights to a public resource. These were captured agencies in 
the most extreme sense.” (footnote omitted)). 
 47. See id. 
 48. See generally Planning & Conservation League v. Dep’t of Water Res., 
83 Cal. App. 4th 892, 914 (2000) (referring to paper water as an “illusion”).  
 49. Id. 
 50. Id.  
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ronic waterless water rights is evidence that the long-revered 
edifice of priority has been pushed to its limit.  
To outsiders, it strains logic that administrators continue 
to issue water rights that rarely, if ever, yield water. But to 
westerners, paper water rights may provide satisfying evidence 
that the system is working. Indeed, a long line of would-be wa-
ter users demonstrates that the state has achieved “maximum 
utilization” of its scarce water resources—the idea that as 
many users as possible should be allowed to put the state’s wa-
ter to work.51 In 1968, the Colorado Supreme Court refused to 
uphold an injunction against the pumping of a junior well, even 
though its operation likely interfered with senior water users 
diverting from a nearby river.52 To justify this departure from 
strict priority, the court cited to a competing principle, that of 
“maximum utilization.” Finding this principle implicitly rooted 
in the state constitution, the court explained, “[a]s administra-
tion of water approaches its second century the curtain is open-
ing upon the new drama of maximum utilization and how con-
stitutionally that doctrine can be integrated into the law of 
vested rights.”53 Further, the court articulated, “[w]e have 
known for a long time that the doctrine was lurking in the 
backstage shadows as a result of the accepted, though oft vio-
lated, principle that the right to water does not give the right to 
waste it.”54 Under this predilection for maximum utilization, it 
is not uncommon to see “fully appropriated,” dry riverbeds in 
the West in late summer because the right to use to every last 
drop of water has been allocated to the fullest extent possible.55
Many western water supplies are now beyond full appro-
priation, instead becoming seriously “overappropriated.” That 
is, in some watersheds the cumulative volume of legal water 
entitlements far exceeds the average annual flow of the river.
 
56
 
 51. Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986, 994 (Colo. 1968). 
 
 52. Id.; see also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-226 (2003) (“[W]hile the doctrine of 
‘first in time is first in right’ is recognized, a reasonable exercise of this right 
shall not block full economic development of underground water resources.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 53. Fellhauer, 447 P.2d at 994. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See generally David H. Getches, The Metamorphosis of Western Water 
Policy: Have Federal Laws and Local Decisions Eclipsed the State’s Role?, 20 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 8, 9 (2001) [hereinafter Getches, The Metamorphosis] (as-
serting that western “rivers became fully appropriated early in the twentieth 
century”). 
 56. Id. at 10–11 (citing DONALD J. PISANI, TO RECLAIM A DIVIDED WEST: 
WATER, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 1848–1902, at 37–38 (1992)).  
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The Colorado River, which serves as the lifeblood of seven 
states, has been overappropriated since 1922, when an inflated 
estimate of its flow was the basis of an interstate allocation.57 
On an intrastate level, many western states have stretched 
their rivers to the limit. In Colorado, most surface streams are 
overappropriated.58 Likewise, in Idaho—which favors “full eco-
nomic development” and “optimum use”—water supplies have 
been over-allocated so severely that in 2007, almost three thou-
sand junior water users worried that their water rights would 
be curtailed unless nature provided snowpack at 105% of nor-
mal.59 California has also fully appropriated60 and 
overappropriated many of its watersheds. In the critical Bay-
Delta region, for example, the State Water Board estimated in 
2008 that appropriative water rights had a face value of 245 
million acre-feet, as compared to an average annual unim-
paired flow of approximately 29 million acre-feet. In other 
words, the Water Board had overappropriated water rights in 
that basin by up to61 about 800%.62
 
 57. Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs of Arapahoe v. Crystal Creek Homeowners’ 
Ass’n, 14 P.3d 325, 332 n.8 (Colo. 2000) (noting that the Colorado River Com-
pact of 1922 “overestimates the actual quantity of available Colorado River 
water during many years, due to variations in rainfall, snowfall, and resulting 
run-off”); David H. Getches, Water Management in the United States and the 
Fate of the Colorado River Delta in Mexico, 11 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 107, 107–08 
(2003) (discussing Colorado River overappropriation). 
  
 58. See Derek L. Turner, Comment, Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation 
Dist. v. Trout Unlimited and an Anti-Speculation Doctrine for a New Era of 
Water Supply Planning, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 639, 646 (2011) (asserting “virtu-
ally all surface water is overappropriated” (citing High Plains A & M, LLC v. 
Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 120 P.3d 710, 721–22 (Colo. 2005) to note 
that three out of four of Colorado’s major rivers are overappropriated, and City 
of Aurora ex rel. Util. Enter. v. Colo. State Eng’r, 105 P.3d 595, 607 (Colo. 
2005) for the proposition that “[t]he South Platte River Basin is substantially 
overappropriated”)). See generally Sandra Zellmer, The Anti-Speculation Doc-
trine and its Implications for Collaborative Water Management, 8 NEV. L.J. 
994 (2008) (discussing the anti-speculation doctrine).  
 59. Jennifer M. Carlquist, Conjunctive Management: A New Battle of Pri-
ority in Idaho Water Law, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 143, 144–45, 169–70 (2008). 
 60. The State Water Resources Control Board. has designated numerous 
streams “fully appropriated” year-round or during specific months. CAL. WA-
TER CODE §§ 1205–1207 (West 2009). For a table of fully appropriated 
streams, see Fully Appropriated Streams, STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL 
BOARD., http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/ 
fully_appropriated_streams/ (lasted updated Mar. 1, 2009). 
 61. The magnitude of the apparent overappropriation may be diminished 
by a variety of factors, including re-use of water and the necessity of more 
than one permit for some water uses in California’s complex diversion and 
storage systems. See STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., WATER RIGHTS WITHIN 
THE BAY/DELTA WATERSHED 3–4 (2008). 
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Under the appropriation doctrine, the mere grant of a wa-
ter right does not constitute an absolute guarantee by the state 
that every water user, no matter how junior, will be satisfied in 
any particular year. In light of uneven levels of annual precipi-
tation, some degree of overappropriation may be necessary to 
ensure efficient use of water resources, much like airlines over-
book flights and keep a standby list to ensure that no seat goes 
empty.63 At the same time, however, water users hold the un-
derstandable expectation that their state-granted water rights 
represent more than an empty token.64
C. PRIORITY AT THE BREAKING POINT 
 The line between full 
appropriation and overappropriation is a fine one. But at some 
point, significant overappropriation indicates a breakdown of 
the system and a refusal to recognize natural limits. The mas-
sive gap between appropriated water volumes and natural sup-
ply suggests that the states are making promises (albeit quali-
fied ones) they cannot keep. In sum, the prior appropriation 
doctrine has produced the overappropriated West—a region of 
too many promises, too little water. 
1. Priority Celebrated 
The common-law prior appropriation doctrine is rooted in 
scarcity. Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, courts in the 
dry western states recognized the doctrine as the law of their 
 
 62. Id. at 2–3. In such cases, according to the Water Board, the face value 
of legal water rights exceeds the volume of water hydrologically available for 
use. Id. at 3. In limited circumstances, the Board may continue to grant water 
rights, even if the source is fully appropriated. In the case of agricultural pro-
jects, for example, the Water Board’s historic practices called for approving 
new water rights as long as water was available in at least some of the years. 
Id. This practice, together with other current and historic factors, has caused 
some stream systems to be overappropriated. See California Water Impact 
Network, Central Valley Watershed Over-Appropriation, http://www.c-win.org/ 
node/67 (last visited Nov. 3, 2012) (asserting that California water agencies 
“vastly overcommitted water from the Bay-Delta’s Central Valley watershed 
streams”).  
 63. See STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., supra note61, at 3 (“[T]he State 
Water Board is required to maximize the beneficial use of water.”). 
 64. See, e.g., In re Hitchcock & Red Willow Irrigation Dist., 410 N.W.2d 
101, 108 (Neb. 1987) (determining that for unappropriated water to be availa-
ble in a practical sense, “the supply of water must be fairly continuous and de-
pendable” (citing Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922))); GRANT & WE-
BER, supra note 28, at 127–35. 
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jurisdictions.65 They rejected riparianism, a competing common-
law doctrine followed in the wetter eastern states, under which 
only those who own so-called riparian lands that abut a natural 
watercourse have the right to use the adjacent stream or lake.66 
Instead, western judges celebrated the appropriation doctrine’s 
unique ability to allocate precious water resources among users 
in a parched landscape, regardless of land ownership.67 They 
believed its operating principle—first in time, first in right—
provided an ordering precept and the muscle sufficient to guide 
the rough-and-tumble settlement of the West by miners and 
farmers.68
Even the most pragmatic westerner can wax poetic when it 
comes to the appropriation doctrine, in general, and the ele-
ment of priority, in particular. Colorado Supreme Court Justice 
Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., who practiced environmental and water 
law for decades before his elevation to the bench in 1996, has 
celebrated the role of priority in numerous talks and writings.
 
69 
In 2002, he responded to critics of priority in an article titled 
Priority: The Most Misunderstood Stick in the Bundle.70 He ar-
gued that priority would remain at the heart of water policy in 
the twenty-first century.71 In fact, priority would ground the 
doctrine as it faced modern challenges, including fostering en-
vironmental protection and preservation, satisfying recreation-
al demand, enforcing pollution control, and accommodating 
population growth.72
 
 65. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 145–47 (1855); Coffin v. The Left Hand 
Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446 (1882); Yunker v. Nichols, 1 Colo. 551, 565–66 
(1872). 
 In scarcity, Justice Hobbs saw an oppor-
 66. For a discussion of the dubious legal heritage of the doctrine, see Dale 
D. Goble, Prior Appropriation and the Property Clause: A Dialogue of Accom-
modation, 71 OR. L. REV. 381, 382–84 (1992) (arguing that the prior appropri-
ation doctrine “has a mirage at its core, just like the shimmering waters of the 
Great American Desert that danced before the prospector and his cantanker-
ous mule” because western territorial legislatures explicitly adopted the 
“common law of England” (riparianism)) and Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, 
Property Rights and the Future of Water Law, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 268 
(1990) (arguing that the “‘pure’ appropriation state of Colorado . . . became 
pure only by judicial revisionism in reading the Territorial legislature’s ripari-
an statutes”). 
 67. See cases cited supra note 65. 
 68. See id. 
 69. See Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Priority: The Most Misunderstood Stick in 
the Bundle, 32 ENVTL. L. 37, 37 (2002). 
 70. See id. 
 71. See id. at 50–55. 
 72. See id. 
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tunity: the chance for community resolution of the tension be-
tween vested priorities to the beneficial use of water and the 
demand for new uses in accordance with “the changing customs 
and values of the people.”73
The two chambers of the western heart, the two lobes of the western 
mind, are beneficial use and preservation. Growth and glorious natu-
ral habitat, this is the heritage of the public domain. Our rapidly ur-
banizing western experience is bridled by our love for the vistas, riv-
ers, and all life, our natural optimism, and our need for each other. In 
this our western place, so prized by the entire country, shall carry us 
forward.
 In conclusion, Justice Hobbs’s prose 
gave way to poetry: 
74
Justice Hobbs was not alone as he penned his ode to priority. 
Numerous other jurists, administrative officials, and scholars 
share his reverence for one of the foundational principles of 
western water law.  
 
In 1855, the California Supreme Court recognized in Irwin 
v. Phillips that “a universal sense of necessity and propriety 
[had] so firmly fixed [the priority principle] as that [it had] 
come to be looked upon as having the force and effect of res ju-
dicata.”75 The court called for protection of the rights of miners 
and others “who, by prior appropriation, have taken the waters 
from their natural beds, and by costly artificial works have 
conducted them for miles over mountains and ravines, to sup-
ply the necessities of gold diggers . . . .”76 Without legal protec-
tion of their expectations, the court warned that “the most im-
portant interests of the mineral region would remain without 
development.”77
Like California, Colorado has long praised priority as an 
allocation principle. In the 1882 case of Coffin v. Left Hand 
Ditch Co., the Colorado Supreme Court emphatically declared 
the eastern riparian doctrine inapplicable in its state, fearing 
that to do otherwise would invite disaster.
 
78 Citing an 
“[i]mperative necessity”79
 
 73. See id. at 53–55. 
 unknown in wetter climates, the 
court held that the first user of water from a natural stream for 
a beneficial purpose has a prior right to the use of the water as 
against all competing claimants. As the court explained, 
 74. Id. at 55. 
 75. 5 Cal. 140, 146 (1855). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. 6 Colo. 443, 446–47 (1882). 
 79. Id. 
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“[h]ouses have been built, and permanent improvements made; 
the soil has been cultivated, and thousands of acres have been 
rendered immensely valuable, with the understanding that ap-
propriations of water would be protected.”80 It concluded with 
an ominous warning: “Deny the doctrine of . . . superiority of 
right by priority of appropriation, and a great part of the value 
of all this property is at once destroyed.”81
Similar to judges, western water administrators embrace 
priority, sometimes with a mixture of practicality and opti-
mism. In a 2002 address to a group of water lawyers, Wyoming 
State Engineer Patrick T. Tyrrell rejected the views of those 
who “portray the priority system in Wyoming and the West as a 
vestige of its former self, a system whose applicability has di-
minished along with the importance of the chuck wagon and 
the wheelwright . . . .”
 
82 He suggested that critics “might enjoy 
the analogous definition of democracy: it’s the worst system ev-
er devised by man, except for everything else.”83 Looking for-
ward to the twenty-first century, Tyrrell expressed confidence 
in priority’s adaptive abilities. He asked “where is water law 
headed in Wyoming?”84 Responding to his own question, Tyrrell 
responded, “Nowhere. By that, I mean I believe the priority 
system must remain. It becomes more flexible as it gets old-
er . . . . For example, although ‘beneficial use’ historically re-
quired physical diversion or storage of water, instream flows 
have been recognized by statute since 1986 as a beneficial 
use.”85 He added wryly, such flexibility represents “an evolu-
tionary trait we humans can envy.”86
Like judges and administrators, scholars have touted the 
virtues of priority. Many point to the relatively secure property 
rights that emerge from the priority system, giving senior wa-
ter users enough confidence in the stability of their water 
rights to invest in water-dependent enterprises, thereby secur-
ing optimal development of the West.
 
87
 
 80. Id. 
 Many others note that 
 81. Id. 
 82. Patrick T. Tyrrell, Wyoming Water Law: Priority, Drought and the 
North Platte River, WYO. LAWYER, June 2002, at 33. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 48. 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. 
 87. See, e.g., CHARLES J. MEYERS, NAT’L WATER COMM’N, LEGAL STUDY 
NO. 1: A HISTORICAL AND FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE APPROPRIATION SYS-
TEM 3–6 (1971); FRANK J. TRELEASE, NAT’L WATER COMM’N, LEGAL STUDY NO. 
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the prioritization of water rights is an essential prerequisite to 
the development of “water markets” capable of reallocating wa-
ter rights to accommodate changing societal needs.88 Others 
would extend the benefits of priority further, as by fully privat-
izing that portion of an appropriator’s usufructuary right 
equivalent to its historic beneficial consumptive use.89 Still oth-
er scholars have called for the extension of appropriation’s pri-
ority principle into new areas of dispute. When the Endangered 
Species Act imposes liability on water users for jeopardizing 
listed species or adversely modifying critical instream habitat, 
one scholar argues that the water users’ relative priorities 
should be the basis of any determination of proximate cause 
and allocation of responsibility among diverters.90
2. Priority Questioned 
 
As described in the previous section, many wax poetic 
about the virtues of priority. But others believe that priority 
poses an obstacle to modern water use because it has “frozen” 
scarce water resources into low-value uses, including certain 
agricultural practices that are no longer highly valued by socie-
ty.91 As a result, these critics argue, the influence of priority is 
waning and should continue to wane as it proves insufficient to 
tackle modern challenges.92
 
5: FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN WATER LAW 5–6 (1971). Both of these ex-
cerpts are cited in GRANT & WEBER, supra note 
 Doubts about the continued viabil-
ity of priority—at least in its absolute form—fall into four cate-
28, at 9–11. See also TERRY L. 
ANDERSON & PAMELA SNYDER, WATER MARKETS: PRIMING THE INVISIBLE 
PUMP 33–34 (1997); Dean Lueck, The Rule of First Possession and the Design 
of the Law, 38 J.L. & ECON. 393, 427–430 (1995). 
 88. See infra Part II.C. 
 89. Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Public Water-Private Water: Anti-
Speculation, Water Reallocation, and High Plains A&M, LLC v. Southeastern 
Colorado Water Conservancy District, 10 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 1, 15–19 
(2006). 
 90. James R. Rasband, Priority, Probability, and Proximate Cause: Les-
sons from Tort Law About Imposing ESA Responsibility for Wildlife Harm on 
Water Users and Other Joint Habitat Modifiers, 33 ENVTL. L. 595, 620–23 
(2003). 
 91. GETCHES, NUTSHELL, supra note 24, at 101–02; A. Dan Tarlock, The 
Future of Prior Appropriation in the New West, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 769, 
770–72 (2001) [hereinafter Tarlock, The Future] (recounting the evolution of 
prior appropriation and criticisms that perpetual rights “lock too much water 
into marginal agriculture and generally encourage inefficient off-stream con-
sumptive uses to the detriment of aquatic ecosystem values and the needs of 
growing urban areas”). 
 92. See infra Part I.C.2. 
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gories. As discussed below, critics challenge the purity of priori-
ty’s claimed historical pedigree; question the modern doctrine’s 
adherence to priority in practice; chronicle non-priority water 
uses specifically approved under the doctrine; and list other 
federal and state laws that may have eclipsed the influence of 
priority.93 In fact, in 1991, one scholar notably proclaimed the 
death of prior appropriation.94
First, legal historians have begun to question the very 
foundations of the doctrine. According to traditional lore, east-
ern water law allowed a relative few riparian landowners to 
monopolize the use of water resources.
 
95 Appropriation, the sto-
ry continues, broke ranks with such monopolistic tendencies by 
allowing anyone to make a valid appropriation of water, re-
gardless of land ownership, and regardless of wealth.96 But 
some legal historians have countered this egalitarian genesis 
story.97 Instead, they have documented a contrarian history 
that grounds the appropriation doctrine in concerns other than 
widespread opportunity, economic growth, and efficiency.98
 These historians suggest that the doctrine was borne out of 
a concern for distributive justice and fairness.
  
99 According to 
this view, priority was neither the “cornerstone” of early water 
law in states including Colorado, nor was it an “absolute 
rule.”100 Instead, it was of an “auxiliary nature” that was subor-
dinate to other concerns.101 For example, some state constitu-
tions recognize that preference, not priority, might guide cer-
tain allocation decisions.102
 
 93. See id. 
 As such, in times of shortage, 
administrators might favor domestic over agricultural use and 
 94. See Charles F. Wilkinson, In Memoriam: Prior Appropriation 1848–
1991, 21 ENVTL. L. v, v (1991) [hereinafter Wilkinson, In Memoriam]. 
 95. David B. Schorr, Appropriation as Agrarianism: Distributive Justice 
in the Creation of Property Rights, 32 ECOL. L.Q. 3, 7–10 (2005) (referring to 
the consensus view as “mythical” and “contradicted by the historical evi-
dence”). 
 96. See id.; Sax, supra note 66. 
 97. See Schorr, supra note 95, at 7–10. 
 98. See id. 
 99. See id.  
 100. Id. at 53–54; see also Samuel C. Wiel, “Priority” in Western Water Law, 
18 YALE L.J. 189, 189 n.3 (1909). 
 101. See Schorr, supra note 95, at 53–54. 
 102. Id. at 44–45; see also GETCHES, NUTSHELL, supra note 24, at 103–06 
(discussing the relationship between preferences and priority). 
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agricultural use over industrial use—rather than relying on the 
order in which water rights were initiated.103
As early as 1909, eminent water scholar Samuel C. Wiel 
argued that priority’s importance had been exaggerated.
 
104 Ex-
amining a half-century of case law, Wiel explained, “there has 
always been a minority current of authority contending that 
the exclusiveness of a prior right should be recognized only to a 
certain degree, and that priorities should not be enforced when 
to do so would be ‘unreasonable’ to water users upon the same 
stream, though subsequent in time of use.”105
[T]he “exclusiveness” rule of priority comes more and more in conflict 
with the community idea. Justice is coming more and more to demand 
an equitable co-relation of the users for the common good, and these 
changed conditions have caused here and there revivals of the idea 
that the priority must be reasonable . . . or it will not be fully en-
forced.
 Looking forward, 
Wiel observed:  
106
Wiel predicted “a weakening of the strict rule of priority” and 
the growth of what might be called “the principle of unreasona-
ble priority.”
 
107
As a second challenge to priority, observers have docu-
mented the failure of administrators to enforce the principle 
consistently. Some scholars note the irony of the diminishing 
practical significance of priority in the implementation of the 
doctrine that bears its name. Professor Dan Tarlock has argued 
that “priority enforcement is more bluff than substance . . . .”
 
108 
He lists numerous circumstances in which priority is not fol-
lowed, including the administration of some irrigation water 
rights, the practice of “water spreading” to non-authorized 
places of use, general stream adjudications, the municipal “su-
per-preference,” and the regulation of users (such as Arizona 
and California) that hold large blocks of water.109
 
 103. See GETCHES, NUTSHELL, supra note 
 Tarlock sug-
24, at 104–06. 
 104. Wiel, supra note 100, at 190. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 194 (quotation marks omitted). 
 107. Id. at 198. 
 108. A. Dan Tarlock, Prior Appropriation: Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric?, 76 
N.D. L. REV. 881, 883 (2000) [hereinafter Tarlock, Rule, Principle, or Rheto-
ric?].  
 109. Tarlock, The Future, supra note 91, at 778–85; see also id. at 775–78 
(describing priority as a “shadow doctrine” and presenting “scattered empirical 
evidence” in support of contention that “priority exists more as a threat than 
an actual enforcement practice”). Further, Tarlock questions whether the en-
forcement of priorities contributes meaningfully to the doctrine’s underlying 
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gests that equitable sharing and cooperation, not priority, dom-
inate in actual practice.110 As he explains, “[p]riority’s modern 
significance lies in the threat of enforcement rather than the 
actual enforcement because it encourages water users to coop-
erate either to reduce the risk of enforcement to as close to zero 
as possible or to share more equitably the burdens of shortag-
es.”111 Overall, he concludes, “[i]t is perhaps more accurate to 
describe prior appropriation as an extreme default rule of de-
creasing marginal importance.”112
As a third line of departure from the rhetoric of priority, 
some chronicle the circumstances under which the modern doc-
trine specifically permits—and sometimes embraces—non-
priority administration of water rights. Recognized priority ex-
ceptions include the doctrines of full economic development, 
beneficial use, reasonable use, absence of waste, optimum use, 
futile calls,
 
113 and plans for augmentation.114 In the case of 
groundwater, many states do not call for strict priority en-
forcement. If they did, a handful of large-volume senior appro-
priators could insist on maintaining historic aquifer levels, 
thereby rendering entire aquifers off-limits to anyone else.115 
Further, the need for priority administration can be reduced by 
the construction of large storage reservoirs that add year-round 
security to water rights.116
 
goal, which he describes as “the protection of investment-backed expectations 
from the risks of variable water years and perhaps now global climate 
change.” Tarlock, Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric?, supra note 
 Moreover, experiments with rainwa-
108, at 883–84.  
 110. See Tarlock, Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric?, supra note 108, at 883. 
 111. See id.  
 112. Id. at 894; see also Michael C. Blumm, The Rhetoric of Water Reform 
Resistance: A Response to Hobbs’ Critique of Long’s Peak, 24 ENVTL. L. 171, 
186 (1994) (“The current system of water allocation suffers from poor enforce-
ment, little citizen involvement, and virtually eschews comprehensive plan-
ning entirely.”); Getches, The Metamorphosis, supra note 55, at 9 (discussing 
the passage of the era “when the key issues could be refereed by an official 
who enforced simple priorities among rights holders”). 
 113. See generally Carlquist, supra note 59 (discussing concepts such as 
full economic development, beneficial use, reasonable use, absence of waste, 
optimum use, and futile call). 
 114. Part II.A discusses plans for augmentation. 
 115. See, e.g., Tarlock, The Future, supra note 91, at 777 (“The [priority] 
doctrine has endured in part because it is able to accommodate new users and 
to adapt to the increasing scale of use.”); see also Carlquist, supra note 59, at 
161–70 (describing conjunctive management in Idaho of surface water and 
groundwater, and analyzing the role of priority in such management). 
 116. Tarlock, The Future, supra note 91, at 778 (arguing that “the costs of 
enforcing prior rights are often likely to be unacceptably high, unfair, and dis-
ruptive of established uses” and citing to the example of California, “which is 
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ter harvesting allow juniors, under limited circumstances, to 
capture and use precipitation, effectively jumping in line ahead 
of seniors who rely on that runoff to replenish the streams and 
aquifers that supply their senior entitlements.117
Fourth, some scholars have noted the diminishing role of 
state law in the allocation of western water resources. Indeed, 
the late David Getches argued in 2001 that state control over 
water resources had long been a “myth” that depended on a 
“precarious . . . congressional forbearance in the exercise of fed-
eral preemption.”
 
118 Increasingly, Getches argued, the states’ 
role was eclipsed by federal influence in areas such as the fed-
eral reclamation program,119 the protection of endangered spe-
cies,120 and federal statutes including the Clean Water Act, 
Clean Air Act, Federal Land Policy and Management Act, and 
the National Forest Management Act.121 Such federal actions, 
Getches noted, joined forces with a series of local, place-based, 
stakeholder-participatory reform efforts.122 Overall, the “most 
important innovations in water policy in the 1990s have oc-
curred in response to federal pressure and local initiatives, and 
almost entirely outside the legislatures and courts of the west-
ern states.”123
Although sweeping state institutional reforms are theoretically possi-
ble, the experience of the recent past suggests that the most promis-
ing advances in the foreseeable future will continue to be ad hoc, out-
side-the-box, responses to problems arising in specific geographic 
areas. Unless states can muster the will to embrace reform when the 
opportunities arise, the federal government along with these local 
groups will continue to foment constructive change.
 Getches concluded:  
124
Taken together, such deviations from priority enforcement 
prompted law professor Charles Wilkinson’s famous 1991 pro-
 
 
famous for solving water allocation problems by constructing a massive water 
infrastructure and allocating water by large blocks, rather than by adjudicat-
ing and enforcing priorities”). 
 117. See Stephen N. Bretsen, Rainwater Harvesting Under Colorado’s Prior 
Appropriation Doctrine: Property Rights and Takings, 22 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. 
REV. 159, 159–60 (2011) (discussing the illegality of rainwater harvest in Colo-
rado prior to the 2009 passage of COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-90-105(1)(f ) and 37-
92-602(1)(g)). 
 118. Getches, The Metamorphosis, supra note 55, at 8. 
 119. Id. at 13–14. 
 120. Id. at 14–18. 
 121. Id. at 17–18. 
 122. Id. at 42–52. 
 123. Id. at 42. 
 124. Id. 
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nouncement of the death of prior appropriation.125 In a provoca-
tive article titled In Memoriam: Prior Appropriation 1848–
1991, Professor Wilkinson anthropomorphized Mr. Prior Ap-
propriation as a “grand man [who] led a grand life—by any 
standard he was one of the most influential people in the histo-
ry of the American West.”126 Among Prior’s accomplishments, 
Wilkinson listed his ability to weather the challenges posed by 
changing public interest standards,127 to support the develop-
ment of numerous communities throughout the West,128 and to 
oversee the great dam-building era of the middle-twentieth 
century.129 In the end, though, Prior’s inability to change and 
his contempt for limits proved to be his undoing.130 In the words 
of Prior’s imagined wife, Prior was sometimes wrong, and “his 
wrong-headedness increased over the years. It seems he just 
couldn’t change—he was so set in his ways, because he believed 
so deeply in his convictions.”131
In sum, as the priority system faces the challenges of envi-
ronmental protection, climate change, and regional population 
growth, it has been stretched to the point that the simple con-
cept of “first come, first served” is not sufficient to defuse all 
conflicts. The pressing need for certainty may drive even senior 
stakeholders to the bargaining table when they are so frustrat-
ed with the status quo that they are willing to forgo some of the 
benefits of their seniority in exchange for the promise of in-
creased certainty, reliability, or other perceived advantages. 
This reduced reliance on the priority system creates a decision-
al void and requires the parties to negotiate an alternate para-
digm to achieve a sustainable allocation of water in the face of 
scarcity. 
 
 
 125. Wilkinson, In Memoriam, supra note 94, at v. 
 126. Id. at v. 
 127. Id. at ix–x. 
 128. Id. at xvii–xviii. 
 129. Id. at xv. 
 130. Id. at xvi and xvii. 
 131. Id. at xvii; see also WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN, supra 
note 27, at xi–xiii (describing the prior appropriation doctrine as one of the 
“lords of yesterday” still dominated by the thinking of another century that 
“simply do not square with the economic trends, scientific knowledge, and so-
cial values in the modern West”). 
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II.  THE REALLOCATION CONTINUUM: FOLLOW THE 
MONEY   
As water supplies have been stretched to satisfy increasing 
demand, the western faith in priority has been tested. Many 
continue to believe that priority can allocate water fairly and 
efficiently among diverse users.132 Others worry that scarcity 
threatens to overwhelm the system, and charge priority with 
“locking up” the oldest, most reliable water rights into uses, 
such as inefficient agricultural practices, that no longer serve 
society well.133 Increasingly, both camps have embraced the 
need for some reallocation of water rights,134 using tools that 
range from water markets to the public trust doctrine.135
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This Part introduces a comprehensive cataloguing of the 
techniques that states have employed to reallocate water. In an 
 
 132. See infra Part II.A.3 (discussing how limitations inherent in the doc-
trine, though rarely enforced, may provide tools for reexamining water usage). 
 133. See infra Part II.A.4 (contrasting the potential of the public trust doc-
trine as a reallocation tool with the reality of the public trust doctrine). 
 134. See WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN, supra note 27, at 287 
(arguing that “[t]he possibilities of reallocation without undue hardship are so 
great in part because the waste and excessive use are so great”); Holly 
Doremus & Michael Hanemann, The Challenges of Dynamic Water Manage-
ment in the American West, 26 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 55, 58, 60–62 
(2008) (discussing how climate change creates the need for water redistribu-
tion and evaluating the challenges to a dynamic approach to water realloca-
tion); George A. Gould, Conversion of Agricultural Water Rights to Industrial 
Use, 27B ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1791, 1791–92 (1982) (arguing that when 
industries need new water supplies, they can either “develop new sources of 
water or . . . transfer water from an existing use” and concluding that “water 
reallocation should begin to occur before all water is allocated; reallocation is 
less costly privately and socially”), quoted in GRANT & WEBER, supra note 28, 
at 11; Douglas L. Grant, Collaborative Solutions to Colorado River Water 
Shortages: The Basin States’ Proposal and Beyond, 8 NEV. L.J. 964, 993 (2008) 
(expressing hope for interbasin reallocation to cope with the growing imbal-
ance between water supply and demand); Tarlock, The Future, supra note 91, 
at 778–81 (discussing alternatives to a strict priority system).  
 135. See infra Part II.B. 
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effort to bring order to the various instruments rattling inside 
state tool boxes, the discussion aligns reallocation options along 
a logical continuum that considers who bears the cost of reallo-
cation. At one end of the sequence lay the seniors pay options—
methods by which administrators cut back senior water rights 
to provide water for emerging societal values such as recreation 
and environmental protection.136 These tools tend to emphasize 
the public aspect of water, restricting water rights to efficient, 
non-wasteful, beneficial uses of a common resource. At the oth-
er end of the continuum, the juniors pay options call for new 
users to buy out, compensate, or otherwise yield to older water 
uses, even if the older uses are of marginal social utility.137
In addition to the continuum, accompanying schemata 
identify circumstances under which each grouping of tools 
works best and circumstances under which each grouping is 
contraindicated. Although seniors pay regulatory options work 
well in some situations, laxity of enforcement has strengthened 
seniors’ sense of absolute entitlement, which has provided fur-
ther support for an unspoken culture of non-enforcement.
 The-
se options stress the private aspect of water as a type of proper-
ty right. 
138 
Similarly, although juniors pay tools are useful in some cases, 
the development of water markets has been hindered by unex-
pected inefficiencies, transaction costs, and third-party im-
pacts;139 and the compensation of seniors through the regulato-
ry takings doctrine has produced an analytically incoherent 
line of inconsistent judicial opinions.140
A. THE SENIORS PAY 
 After laying out both 
ends of the reallocation continuum, this Part concludes that 
additional viable solutions may lie in the middle, in the context 
of voluntary stakeholder negotiations. Part IV takes up that 
middle path in more detail, introducing the concept of “water 
bankruptcy.” 
Although the priority system recognizes superior rights in 
a watershed’s first appropriators, a number of built-in doctrinal 
controls render this superiority less than absolute in particular 
 
 136. See infra Part II.A. 
 137. See infra Part II.B. 
 138. Cf. supra notes 108–12 and accompanying text (discussing the effects 
of the culture of non-enforcement on priority). 
 139. See infra notes 194–200 and accompanying text. 
 140. See infra Part II.B.3. 
  
584 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:560 
 
circumstances. Some of the limitations bow to reality by recog-
nizing physical and historical constraints or tailoring priority 
administration to the unique characteristics of groundwater. 
Others strive to give meaning to the doctrine’s core element—
beneficial use. Still others reflect the public-private tension in-
herent in the allocation of water, and adjust the latter in the 
name of the former.141 Overall, however, the seniors pay mech-
anisms tend to be under-enforced. As one scholar has noted in 
the context of the Pacific Northwest, states routinely elevate 
protection of established uses over limitations inherent in the 
priority doctrine, including prohibitions against non-use, waste, 
and expansion of use.142
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 141. See Sax, supra note 66, at 281 (claiming that western allocation sys-
tems operated to elevate the private aspect of water over the public aspect). 
 142. Reed D. Benson, Maintaining the Status Quo: Protecting Establishes 
Water Uses in the Pacific Northwest, Despite the Rules of Prior Appropriation, 
28 ENVTL. L. 881, 883 (1998). 
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The Seniors Pay  Works Best When . . . Contraindications 
— Futile call 
Navigating the Nuances of 
Priority 
— Federal reserved water 
rights 
— Plans for augmentation 
— Stream bed is dry and 
seniors far downstream, 
making usable deliveries 
difficult (futile call) 
— Jurisdiction has experi-
ence with combined admin-
istration of surface and 
groundwater supplies; ready 
availability of reservoir stor-
age (augmentation) 
 
— Administrators unwilling or 
unable to enforce limits against 
senior users; lack of data on 
actual beneficial use (futile 
call)143
— No tradition of conjunctive 
use of surface and groundwater 
supplies; limited reservoir stor-
age available (augmentation) 
 
— Maximum beneficial use 
Managing Groundwater 
— Reasonable means of 
withdrawal 
— Aquifer receives little an-
nual recharge and mining 
potential is great 
— Aquifers have close hydro-
geologic connection with sur-
face supplies 
— Waste prohibition 
Requiring Actual & Benefi-
cial Use 
— Abandonment (whole or 
partial) 
— General stream adjudica-
tions 
— State permits sale of wa-
ter rights, and agricultural 
users actively sell out to mu-
nicipalities (waste, aban-
donment) 
— Volume of beneficial use 
inconsistent with volume of 
water claimed (general adju-
dications) 
— Few active markets for wa-
ter rights (waste, abandon-
ment) 
— State maintains comprehen-
sive records of water rights and 
actual use (general adjudica-
tions) 
— Public trust doctrine 
Protecting Public Values — Well accepted in Califor-
nia144
— Repudiated in Colorado
 
145
1. Navigating the Nuances of Priority 
 
Administrators are charged with enforcing water rights in 
order of priority.146
 
 143. Id. at 891, 893–95 (discussing political limitations on restricting sen-
ior users). 
 However, they will not automatically shut 
 144. See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 732 
(Cal. 1983). 
 145. See People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1028–29 (Colo. 1979) (rejecting 
the application of the public trust doctrine to non-navigable watercourses). 
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down junior appropriators whenever seniors “call” for satisfac-
tion of their water rights.147 Instead, administrators consider a 
variety of physical factors, including the flow of the stream, the 
relative saturation of the stream bed, and the lag time between 
junior shut-off and potential senior delivery.148 If administra-
tors conclude that it is not physically possible to deliver water 
to seniors in usable quantities, then they will deem the call “fu-
tile” and decline to curtail junior users.149 Historically, however, 
administrators have been loath to deviate from the priority sys-
tem, even if it would take heroic efforts to deliver a slight vol-
ume of water to a calling senior. For example, in one extreme 
case cited frequently in water law casebooks, the Nebraska Su-
preme Court recognized the right of downstream senior appro-
priators to call for their water, even though stream conditions 
required “approximately 700 second-feet of water at North 
Platte to deliver 162 second-feet at the headgate of the Kearney 
canal when the river bed is wet.”150 That is, water administra-
tors would shepherd relatively large volumes of past upstream 
juniors’ diversion points in order to deliver only a small volume 
to the downstream seniors (the difference would be lost to 
seepage, evaporation, and the like). The court suggested that 
administrators should take care to avoid departures from prior-
ity enforcement and should resist declaring senior calls futile 
because that “would clothe . . . officers with a discretion incom-
patible with the vested interests of the [seniors], and destroy 
the very purpose of the doctrine of appropriation existent in 
this state.”151 Rather, the court held, the law “does not . . . au-
thorize the administrator of the waters of the stream to refrain 
from delivering a usable quantity of water to a senior appropri-
ator because it might appear to him that excessive losses would 
result.”152
Beyond the generally rare circumstance of futile calls, sen-
iors may be systemically curtailed when a court determines 
that senior water rights have been impliedly reserved by the 
federal government, even if those senior rights have not previ-
 
 
 146. GETCHES, NUTSHELL, supra note 24, at 103–04. 
 147. See id. 
 148. See, e.g., State ex rel. Cary v. Cochran, 292 N.W. 239, 244–46 (Neb. 
1940). 
 149. GETCHES, NUTSHELL, supra note 24, at 103–04. 
 150. Cary, 292 N.W. at 245. 
 151. Id. at 247. 
 152. Id. 
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ously been exercised, quantified, or folded into the states’ lad-
ders of priority enforcement. In the 1908 case of Winters v. 
United States, the United States Supreme Court considered the 
potential water rights of Native American tribes in Montana 
that ceded their ancestral lands to the federal government, re-
serving to themselves the vastly diminished acreage encom-
passed within the Fort Belknap Indian reservation.153 The 
Court held that at the time of the reservation, Congress im-
pliedly reserved water rights on behalf of the tribes sufficient to 
carry out the purposes of the reservation.154 Later, courts ap-
plied the federal reserved water rights doctrine to other types 
of federal reservations, including national monuments,155 na-
tional forests,156 national recreation areas,157 and national wild-
life refuges.158 Subsequent litigation has quantified federal wa-
ter reservations and determined their priority dates.159 As a 
result, these implied reservations have been made explicit and 
moved to the front of the priority line in some watersheds, 
thereby cutting back on the amount of water available to exist-
ing seniors.160
A third tool that authorizes departure from strict priority 
enforcement is the so-called plan for augmentation. Most prom-
inent in Colorado, this mechanism allows junior water users to 
make out-of-priority diversions, provided that they replace a 
volume of water equivalent to their consumptive use from an 
alternative source of supply.
 
161 Often, juniors purchase shares 
of reservoir storage water, and substitute releases of this water 
to make up for their out-of-priority depletions.162
 
 153. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908); see also United 
States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) (recognizing that a treaty estab-
lishing an Indian reservation “was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a 
grant of rights from them—a reservation of those not granted”). 
 However, all 
 154. Winters, 207 U.S. at 577. 
 155. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976) (holding that the 
1952 Presidential proclamation of Death Valley as a national monument im-
pliedly reserved sufficient water in Devil’s Hole cavern to sustain the unique 
“Devil’s Hole pupfish”). 
 156. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 718 (1978) (recognizing 
that the United States impliedly reserved water rights when it reserved the 
Gila National Forest, but limiting the purpose of those reservations to the 
primary purposes for which national forests were established). 
 157. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963). 
 158. Id. 
 159. See GETCHES, NUTSHELL, supra note 24, at 330–32. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-90-137(9), 37-92-308(1)(a) (2011).  
 162. GETCHES, NUTSHELL, supra note 24, at 187–88. 
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such plans are subject to the requirement that prior appropria-
tors suffer no injury.163
2. Managing Groundwater 
 As a result, although the seniors pay in 
theory by foregoing their right to strict priority enforcement, 
senior rights are not diminished in any concrete or practical 
sense. 
The physical characteristics of aquifers make it difficult to 
appropriate groundwater under pure principles of priority.164 
Whereas surface streams are recharged annually by precipita-
tion, some aquifers may receive very little annual recharge.165 
As a result, and with the advent of modern technology, it is 
generally possible to pump water out of aquifers at a rate that 
far exceeds recharge.166 As early as 1973, for example, the Na-
tional Water Commission reported that the volume of ground-
water pumped annually in the continental United States ex-
ceeded recharge by a factor of about forty-six.167 As a result, 
aquifers can be “mined,” much as minerals and other resources 
are withdrawn from the earth at unsustainable rates.168
To avoid this problem, even strict priority jurisdictions 
may introduce an element of sharing into their groundwater 
regimes—thereby creating a type of seniors pay tool to allow 
maximum beneficial use of nonrenewable groundwater re-
sources by a broader range of users.
 Theo-
retically, in a pure priority regime, the most-senior appropria-
tor could monopolize an entire aquifer and insist that adminis-
trators curtail all other well operators. Otherwise, the senior 
would claim, the life of the aquifer would be diminished to the 
senior’s detriment. 
169
 
 163. See, e.g., Cache LaPoudre Water Users Ass’n v. Glacier View Mead-
ows, 550 P.2d 288, 294 (Colo. 1976) (“[U]nder the plans for augmentation . . . 
water is available for appropriation when the diversion thereof does not injure 
holders of vested rights.”). 
 In some cases, for exam-
 164. See generally GRANT & WEBER, supra note 28, at 334–424. 
 165. See id. 
 166. See id. 
 167. Id. at 350–51 (citing NAT’L WATER COMM’N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE 
FUTURE 230 (1973)). 
 168. See id.  
 169. See, e.g., Fundingsland v. Colo. Ground Water Comm’n, 468 P.2d 835, 
839 (Colo. 1970) (allowing juniors to deplete aquifer to the detriment of sen-
iors, but limiting overall aquifer depletion to a rate of 40% in 25 years); 
Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986, 994 (Colo. 1968) (refusing to enjoin junior 
well pumping, even though its operation likely interfered with senior water 
users diverting from a nearby river and justifying the result under the compet-
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ple, seniors may be entitled to protection, but only when junior 
pumping threatens “unreasonable” waste or might “unreasona-
bly” affect their prior rights.170 In other cases, seniors will be 
protected, but only to the extent that their wells constitute 
“reasonably adequate” means of withdrawal, in light of econom-
ic and historical factors.171
3. Requiring Actual and Beneficial Use 
  
Under the appropriation doctrine, water rights that are not 
used continuously may be declared abandoned.172 Although in-
tended to promote efficient use of water resources, this use-it-
or-lose-it threat may create a perverse incentive to waste wa-
ter. That is, water users face pressure to inflate their actual or 
claimed volume of water use to guard against potential charges 
of abandonment.173 Despite mechanisms to restrict existing us-
age to beneficial non-wasteful levels, it is rare that administra-
tors declare water rights to be abandoned174 or find that exist-
ing practices constitute waste subject to injunction.175 According 
to one scholar, the theoretical prohibition against waste articu-
lated in every state “has been enforced sporadically at best.”176
Despite this general laxity of enforcement, at least two con-
texts provide an opportunity to reexamine the past usage of 
 
 
ing principle of promoting “maximum utilization” of water resources); see also 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-226 (2003) (“[W]hile the doctrine of ‘first in time is first 
in right’ is recognized, a reasonable exercise of this right shall not block full 
economic development of underground water resources.” (emphasis added)). 
 170. Fundingsland, 468 P.2d at 836. 
 171. City of Colo. Springs v. Bender, 366 P.2d 552, 556 (Colo. 1961). 
 172. See, e.g., E. Twin Lakes Ditches & Water Works, Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. 
Comm’rs, 76 P.3d 918, 919 (Colo. 2003) (holding a water right not abandoned 
because the evidence was insufficient to conclude that the appropriator in-
tended to abandon the water right). 
 173. See GETCHES, NUTSHELL, supra note 24, at 117–20 (discussing the 
common historical practice of overstating water rights). 
 174. See, e.g., E. Twin Lakes, 76 P.3d at 920 (declining to hold a water right 
abandoned even though it had not been exercised for approximately thirty 
years). But see N. Kern Water Storage Dist. v. Kern Delta Water Dist., 54 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 578, 601 (Cal. App. 5th 2007) (upholding a declaration of forfeiture). 
 175. GETCHES, NUTSHELL, supra note 24, at 119 (concluding that “[a] water 
right once manifested in a permit or decree is rarely disturbed”). 
 176. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN, supra note 27, at 234–35. 
(“Early on, the rubric of beneficial use also came to encompass the idea that 
water, once validly diverted and put to use, could not be wasted. But the lan-
guage decrying waste was mostly theoretical. It was always difficult to police 
waste, and in some cases to define it, so the prohibition against waste, alt-
hough an announced principle in the cases and statutes of every western state, 
has been enforced sporadically at best.”). 
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water rights and to trim them back to levels of historically de-
monstrable, efficient usage. First, water users may seek per-
mission to change one or more attributes of their water rights—
such as point of diversion, place of use, or type of use—while 
maintaining their senior priorities. This may occur, for exam-
ple, in the context of the sale of a water right from one user to 
another.177
There is absolutely no question that a decreed water right is valuable 
property; that it may be used, its use changed, its point of diversion 
relocated; and that a municipal corporation is not precluded from 
purchasing water rights previously used for agricultural purposes . . . 
provided that no adverse effect be suffered by other users from the 
same stream . . . .
 Most states allow such changes, subject to the “no-
injury rule.” In a typical explanation of the rule, the Colorado 
Supreme Court explained as early as 1954:  
178
Importantly, despite their seniority, prior appropriators 
may not change their water rights if anyone, including juniors, 
will suffer injury. As the Colorado court asserted, “junior ap-
propriators have vested rights in the continuation of stream 
conditions as they existed at the time of their respective appro-
priations, and . . . subsequent to such appropriations they may 
successfully resist all proposed changes . . . which in any way 
materially injure[] or adversely affect[] their rights.”
 
179 To en-
sure no injury to existing water rights, many jurisdictions re-
duce changed water rights to their proven historic, non-
wasteful consumptive use, which may be substantially less 
than the ceiling represented by the face value of water rights.180 
Other jurisdictions go even further by applying complex formu-
las to determine the amount that should have been necessary 
to accomplish the users’ stated purposes.181
The volume of existing water rights may also be restricted 
in the course of proceedings known as “general stream adjudi-
cations.” During such proceedings, administrative tribunals 
seek to close the gap between the volume of water claimed by 
water users (perhaps relying on the face value of their water 
permits or water rights) and the volume of water actually 
 
 
 177. See infra Part II.B (discussing water markets). 
 178. Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 272 P.2d 
629, 631 (1954). 
 179. Id. at 631–32. 
 180. GETCHES, NUTSHELL, supra note 24, at 118–20. 
 181. For example, agricultural water rights may be limited to the “duty of 
water”—the amount of water per acre necessary to grow specified crops, at 
specified altitudes, in specified regions, which is typically statutorily defined. 
See GETCHES, NUTSHELL, supra note 24, at 121–23. 
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placed to historic beneficial use.182 As in change-of-water-right 
proceedings, the general stream adjudication may result in the 
partial abandonment of water rights to the extent of actual 
non-use.183
4. Protecting Public Values 
 
In some states—most notably California, among western 
states—water rights are inherently limited by the public trust 
doctrine. In its seminal decision of 1983, the California Su-
preme Court made clear that the state’s navigable lakes and 
streams are subject to the public trust to protect navigation, 
commerce, fishing, recreational, ecological, and other public 
values.184 According to the court, the state possesses both the 
power and the duty to protect trust assets. In the case of water 
rights, the court explained, “the state has an affirmative duty 
to take the public trust into account in the planning and alloca-
tion of water resources, and to protect public trust uses when-
ever feasible.”185 Even after the state water board issued water 
rights, according to the court, the state retained “the power to 
reconsider allocation decisions” and, in some cases that power 
“extends to the revocation of previously granted [water] 
rights.”186 If state agencies fail to act, members of the public can 
bring a court action to enforce the public trust.187
 
 182. See Tarlock, Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric?, supra note 
 Despite the 
doctrine’s potential impact and apart from a few high-profile 
cases, however, there is very little evidence that California’s 
108, at 882–83. 
As the author explains:  
[T]he enforcement of priorities assumes that adequate use and 
streamflow information exists and that there is a speedy curtailment 
process. This is seldom the case. There is often a large gap between 
the amount of water claimed and the amount of water actually put to 
beneficial use, and this makes enforcement difficult. To remedy this 
problem, western states such as Arizona, Idaho, and Montana have 
invested millions of dollars in general adjudications to quantify rights 
so that the system of priorities can actually be fairly and accurately 
administered over a century after large claims to water were filed.  
Id.  
 183. See id. (mentioning general adjudications in states including Arizona, 
Idaho, and Montana to remedy the problem of “a large gap between the 
amount of water claimed and the amount of water actually put to beneficial 
use, [which] makes enforcement difficult”). 
 184. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983). 
 185. Id. at 728. 
 186. Id. at 728, 723. 
 187. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc. (The Mono Lake 
Case), 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 601 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 2008). 
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public trust doctrine has affected the water use of senior rights 
holders.188
B. THE JUNIORS PAY 
 
 
The Juniors Pay Works Best When . . . Contraindications 
— Call for administration 
Enforcing Priority 
— Overappropriation 
— Annual supply roughly 
equals face value of water 
rights 
— System is overappropriated 
by a significant factor 
— Economic reach 
Managing Groundwater 
— “Critical area” legislation 
— Seniors can afford effi-
ciency measures to extend 
aquifer life for a signifi-
cant number of years 
— Aquifer receives a sig-
nificant amount of annual 
recharge 
— Seniors cannot afford effi-
ciency measures and “call out” 
a significant number of junior 
appropriators 
— Aquifer receives little annual 
recharge 
— Water markets 
Paying for Water 
— The regulatory takings doc-
trine 
— Watershed has few us-
ers potentially impacted 
by transfer, thereby keep-
ing transaction costs low 
(markets) 
— Transaction will generate 
significant externalities, includ-
ing disruption of agricultural 
communities, which cannot be 
remedied easily with financial 
compensation (markets) 
— Doctrinal incoherence makes 
doctrine difficult to apply in the 
context of water rights, particu-
larly when sub-allocated by 
contract (takings) 
1. Enforcing Priority 
The appropriation system requires administrators to satis-
fy the oldest priority in a watershed before the next-most-
senior user receives any deliveries of water.189
 
 188. See Dave Owen, The Mono Lake Case, the Public Trust Doctrine, and 
the Administrative State, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1099, 1104–05 (2012) (explain-
ing the expansive view of the public trust doctrine from the Mono Lake Case 
has been rarely, if ever, used by the courts and is primarily used at the agency 
level as a constraint on new rights and uses rather than on established uses). 
 Thus, by design, 
juniors “pay” for any gap between available supply and the face 
 189. See supra Part I.A. 
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value of water rights by assuming the risk of any shortage. As 
basins become more and more overappropriated, a larger pool 
of juniors with “paper water rights” will bear the cost of any 
shortage of supply.190
2. Managing Groundwater 
 
As discussed above, many jurisdictions that apply the ap-
propriation doctrine to groundwater introduce an element of 
sharing, particularly when regulating aquifers that do not re-
ceive significant amounts of annual recharge from precipita-
tion.191 These modifications of priority are designed to prevent a 
single senior from commanding exclusive use of an aquifer in 
perpetuity. But states applying the appropriation doctrine to 
groundwater must balance this undermining of strict priority 
with the rights of senior appropriators. To spread the burden of 
groundwater shortage, some states insist that seniors use 
groundwater efficiently (as by drilling deeper wells, rather than 
calling for administrators to curtail junior pumping that lowers 
groundwater levels), but only to the extent that such efficient 
technologies are within the seniors’ “economic reach.”192 In 
those jurisdictions, it is unlikely that seniors would be required 
to deepen their wells as aquifer levels declined if such 
measures proved financially infeasible.193
3. Paying for Water 
 
Water markets. Under appropriate circumstances, water 
markets can be helpful in reallocating water among competing 
users so as to achieve economically efficient use.194
 
 190. See supra notes 
 In some cas-
es, markets may be more politically feasible than regulation 
(as, for example, regulations that limit unreasonable or waste-
45–46 and accompanying text. 
 191. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 192. See, e.g., Baker v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 513 P.2d 627, 637 (Idaho 1973) 
(“[S]eniors are not entitled to relief if the junior appropriators, by pumping 
from their wells, force seniors to lower their pumps from historic levels to rea-
sonable pumping levels.”); Wayman v. Murray City Corp., 458 P.2d 861, 865 
(Utah 1969) (“All users are required, when necessary, to employ reasonable 
and efficient means in taking their own waters.”). 
 193. See, e.g., Fellhauer v. People 447 P.2d 986, 994 (Colo. 1968) (“[Seniors] 
cannot be required to improve their extraction facilities beyond their economic 
reach, upon a consideration of all the factors involved.”). 
 194. See generally Jonathan H. Adler, Water Rights, Markets, and Chang-
ing Ecological Conditions, 42 ENVTL. L. 93, 101–02 (2012) (“Insofar as water 
rights are currently allocated to comparatively inefficient uses, water markets 
can help reallocate water to where there is greater need.”). 
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ful water use), because markets are voluntary and rely upon 
the willing participation of both the buyer and the seller.195
However, as several scholars have noted, it is inaccurate to 
describe most water transfers (sales, leases, or options) as pure 
“free market” transactions.
  
196 Rather, the transfer of water 
rights almost always entails a change in the place of use, the 
season of use, the type of use, and/or the pattern of return 
flows.197 As a result, water markets have the potential to impact 
third parties other than the seller and the buyer, and to subject 
other water users to negative externalities.198 To protect the 
vested water rights of other users, many states impose a “no in-
jury” rule on transfers.199 Under this rule, even juniors are pro-
tected, because they are entitled to insist on the continuation of 
the stream conditions that existed at the time they first made 
their appropriations.200 To enforce the “no injury” rule or simi-
lar requirements, the states retain regulatory authority over 
water markets to limit the volume of water transferred to the 
historic consumptive use of water that either has already been 
developed and diverted from a stream for beneficial use or has 
been conserved.201
The regulatory takings doctrine. In 2001, the landmark 
case Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United States 
held that federal water-use restrictions imposed under the En-
dangered Species Act (ESA) unconstitutionally deprived plain-
tiff irrigators of water deliveries.
 
202
 
 195. See id. at 95 (arguing that markets will provide more efficient conser-
vation than government regulation). 
 The case involved the 
unique situation of water contracts held by California water 
districts, which entitled the districts to deliveries of a portion of 
 196. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Importance of Getting Names Right: 
The Myth of Markets for Water, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 317, 
321 (2000); Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Pri-
vate Property Solution, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 533, 576–77 (2007). 
 197. See Sinden, supra note 196, at 578–79. 
 198. Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 134, at 63–68. 
 199. See Monique Dutkowsky, Institutions, Third-Parties and Water Mar-
kets: An Analysis of the Role of Water Rights, the No-Injury Rule, and Water 
Code 386 on Water Markets in California Counties 6 (Prop. and Env’t Research 
Ctr., Workshop Series Paper, 2009), available at http://www.perc.org/files/ 
Dutkowsky%20water%20markets%20third%20parties.pdf. 
 200. See Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 272 
P.2d 629, 631–32 (Colo. 1954). 
 201. See generally Dutkowsky, supra note 199, at 6 (discussing the effect of 
the no-injury rule). 
 202. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 
313, 319–20 (2001). 
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the water yielded under water rights held by state and federal 
entities.203 Tulare represented the first case to hold that regula-
tions under the ESA could work a regulatory taking requiring 
compensation.204 As a test case, it was unfortunately complicat-
ed by the contract/water right dichotomy, leading the court to 
conclude that the environmental regulation constituted a 
“physical” taking of property.205 The court later retreated from 
this position, but left a string of analytically confusing cases in 
its wake.206
C. IMAGINING A MIDDLE PATH 
 
The variety of tools discussed in the previous Part work 
well under a range of narrowly tailored circumstances. But, as 
many have observed, the primacy of priority is breaking down 
as scarcity increases.207 In some cases, administrators refuse to 
curtail juniors, even when seniors are harmed.208 In other cases, 
juniors suffer, as in severely overappropriated basins where 
new water rights are either unavailable209 or represent near-
worthless “paper water rights.”210 Just as troubling, rhetoric 
seldom matches reality. We continue to employ the terminology 
of state water law regimes, even as federal laws and local deci-
sions threaten to “eclipse” the states’ role.211
 
 203. See id. at 314–16. 
 Some have called 
 204. Melinda Harm Benson, The Tulare Case: Water Rights, the Endan-
gered Species Act, and the Fifth Amendment, 32 ENVTL. L. 551, 551 (2002) (as-
serting that “Tulare is the first published court decision holding that efforts to 
protect species under the Endangered Species Act constitute a taking of prop-
erty in violation of the Fifth Amendment”). 
 205. Tulare Lake Basin, 49 Fed. Cl. at 319–20. 
 206. See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 1059 (asserting that after Tulare, 
“the courts continued to struggle with the distinction between physical and 
regulatory takings, and the distinction between takings and contract viola-
tions”). See generally John D. Echeverria, Is Regulation of Water a Constitu-
tional Taking?, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 579 (2010) (examining the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s regulatory takings doctrine decisions); Mark Fenster, The Stubborn 
Incoherence of Regulatory Takings, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 525 (2009) (same); 
Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOL. L.Q. 
307 (2007) (same). 
 207. See supra Part I.C. 
 208. See Hobbs, supra note 69, at 43–44. 
 209. See Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs of Arapahoe v. Crystal Creek Homeown-
ers’ Ass’n, 14 P.3d 325, 333 (Colo. 2000) (precluding the grant of new water 
rights where unappropriated supplies are no longer “available” for appropria-
tion). 
 210. See supra notes 45–50 and accompanying text. 
 211. See Getches, The Metamorphosis, supra note 55, at 11. 
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for a middle path, primarily in the context of voluntary negotia-
tions.212 Seniors would not be allowed to lock up water re-
sources in perpetuity, but neither would they be demonized for 
continuing practices once highly valued by society.213 Juniors 
would have an opportunity, like their predecessors, to acquire 
water rights.214 They would not bear the entire cost of reallocat-
ing water to critical new uses, such as protection of species and 
habitat or maintaining water in place for aesthetic and recrea-
tional enjoyment.215 Most importantly, we would all share the 
pain of modernizing the system to reflect current values. The 
outlook need not be bleak, as one commentator suggested, be-
cause “[t]he possibilities of reallocation without undue hardship 
are so great in part because the waste and excessive use are so 
great.”216
III.  A NEW TOOL: WATER BANKRUPTCY   
 The next Part considers one promising option for a 
negotiated middle path: water bankruptcy. 
Whether acknowledged or not, we have already embarked 
down a middle path of water management, one in both seniors 
and juniors make some compromises in the quest for sustaina-
bility, peace, and certainty. Numerous states have convened 
stakeholder groups to explore what some have called “out-of-
the-box” solutions to watershed-specific problems.217 Seniors, 
juniors, regulators, scientists, farmers, fishers, environmental-
ists, and neighbors have all begun to participate in deciding 
their common water future.218
Although increasingly prevalent, the stakeholder process 
poses at least three challenges for participants. First, the will-
ingness to engage in alternative dispute resolution constitutes, 
at least implicitly, an admission that the current system is not 
working or is otherwise unsustainable. But some participants, 
particularly the holders of senior water rights, may fear that 
such admission compromises the strength of their claims and 
  
 
 212. See WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN, supra note 27, at 
286–92. 
 213. See id. at 289. 
 214. See id. at 290. 
 215. See id. 
 216. Id. at 287. 
 217. Getches, The Metamorphosis, supra note 55, at 55–56 (describing state 
encouragement, through legislation and otherwise, of “watershed-based deci-
sion making”).  
 218. Id. at 42–51 (discussing “outside-the-box” reforms, including “macro-
watershed initiatives”). 
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their bargaining position. Although showing up at a negotiation 
suggests a willingness to compromise, those who hold the oldest 
water rights will, understandably, be reluctant to affirmatively 
relinquish priority as a decisional principle and to substitute a 
pervasive ethic of shared loss.219 As Professor Tarlock has ob-
served, “cooperation and ad hoc sharing do not come easily to 
water users. Alternative allocation systems usually emerge on-
ly when a significant group of water users thinks that coopera-
tion will produce a superior result to the likely legal . . . alloca-
tion of the resource.”220 As a second challenge, a comprehensive 
resolution of competing claims within a particular watershed 
requires a similarly comprehensive cataloging of water supply, 
water demand, actual water use, and existing water rights, 
permits, and contracts. And yet historically, states and water 
users—motivated by pragmatic, economic, and tactical con-
cerns—have resisted “showing their hand” and providing such 
data.221 As a third challenge, negotiators must make room at 
the table for non-traditional participants such as advocates for 
environmental, wildlife, and recreational interests. This forces 
the group to address tough questions about the interrelation-
ship of environmental and human concerns.222
 
 219. As Professor Tarlock has explained, such stakeholder groups are bar-
gaining in the shadow of priority. Tarlock, The Future, supra note 
 
91, at 771 
(describing prior appropriation as a “shadow doctrine” under which “[w]ater 
rights became more of a general water entitlement to use water rather than 
the right to a specific quantity used in a non-wasteful manner as specified by 
the formal doctrine”). He elaborates, “[p]riority’s modern significance lies in 
the threat of enforcement rather than the actual enforcement because it en-
courages water users to cooperate either to reduce the risk of enforcement to 
as close to zero as possible or to share more equitably the burdens of shortag-
es.” Tarlock, Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric?, supra note 108, at 882–83. 
 220. Tarlock, Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric?, supra note 108, at 882–83. 
 221. See, e.g., Sheila M. Olmstead & Robert N. Stavins, Managing Water 
Demand: Price vs. Non-Price Conservation Programs 23 (Pioneer Inst., White 
Paper No. 39, 2007), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/rstavins/ 
Monographs_&_Reports/Pioneer_Olmstead_Stavins_Water.pdf (discussing the 
difficulties of obtaining water demand data in agricultural and industrial sec-
tors). 
 222. As the U.S. Department of the Interior explained:  
A common element of many . . . potential crises . . . is the need to pro-
vide for water supply for people, cities, and farms in a manner that 
also attains the goals of the federal Endangered Species Act. Success 
in meeting this challenge almost always requires a collaborative effort 
between stakeholders, as is demonstrated by the success of the Upper 
Colorado River - San Juan Endangered Fish Recovery Programs.  
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, WATER 2025: PREVENTING CRISES AND CONFLICT 
IN THE WEST 20 (2003), available at http://biodiversity.ca.gov/Meetings/ 
archive/water03/water2025.pdf. Water 2025 has been incorporated into the 
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 To provide guidance for this emerging middle collaborative 
path, this Part introduces the new concept of “water bankrupt-
cy.” By drawing an analogy to the well-developed principles of 
federal bankruptcy law, this Article offers a systematic, regu-
larized way of thinking about a collection of place-specific, sui 
generis processes independently springing up across the West 
and beyond.223
 
Water Conservation Initiative, which has been superseded by the Bureau of 
Reclamation’s “WaterSMART” program. See WaterSMARTReclamation: Man-
aging Water in the West: Water 2025, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, http://www.usbr 
.gov/WaterSMART/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2012). 
 Reducing the need for collaborators to invent a 
process and conceptual basis anew in each case, this Article of-
fers a common vocabulary and framework to encourage the de-
velopment of an interstate knowledge base of best practices for 
collaborative processes. It bears repeating that this Article is 
not advocating the widespread replacement of state admin-
istration with stakeholder consensus, nor does it advocate the 
wholesale substitution of sharing for priority. Rather, the sug-
gestion draws on principles of traditional bankruptcy to provide 
a systematic framework for willing collaborators who have vol-
untarily turned away from traditional processes and toward 
negotiation to resolve their water conflicts. Bankruptcy and 
 223. Watershed groups include: the Puget Sound Partnership, http://www 
.psp.wa.gov/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2012); the Cienega Watershed Partnership, 
http://www.cienega.org/who-we-are/svpp-forum/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2012); the 
Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery Program, http://www 
.coloradoriverrecovery.org/general-information/about.html (last visited Nov. 3, 
2012); the Lower Colorado Multi-Species Conservation Program, http://www 
.lcrmscp.gov/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2012); and the Great Lakes Commission, 
http://www.glc.org/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2012). See generally James L. Huff-
man, The Federal Role in Water Resource Management, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 
669, 669, 689 (2008) (“Historically the solution to growing demand was in-
creased supply through storage or transport. Today the only solution in many 
cases is shifting water from one use to another. Absent effective local and in-
terstate water markets, these shifts in water use can only be accomplished 
through the political process. That is where the collaboration part of the mod-
ern approach comes in.”). 
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water law negotiations face a remarkably similar challenge: the 
situation where debts exceed assets, whether financial or hy-
drologic. Both seek similar goals: a fresh start for the debtor 
and a fair and methodical resolution for the creditors. Both are 
grounded in priority, but recognize important, competing val-
ues. The concepts—and often, the terminology—are strikingly 
similar: both systems contemplate priorities, preferences, risk, 
and scarcity. 
The following sections provide a brief overview of tradi-
tional bankruptcy principles, focusing on those that have a 
clear counterpart within the realm of water law negotiations. 
Then, the analysis turns to water bankruptcy, examining its 
mechanics in detail and noting three contexts for which it is 
particularly well suited. Next, the Article presents a case 
study—the California Bay Delta. Reviewing decades of unsuc-
cessful efforts in the region, the discussion considers how bank-
ruptcy concepts could provide a useful and practical roadmap 
for structuring that collaborative process. Finally, the analysis 
teases out the four primary benefits of the water bankruptcy 
concept. In sum, the intuitive and apt comparison to bankrupt-
cy law suggests a way forward for water-starved communities 
at a stalemate. 
A. BANKRUPTCY: THE TRADITIONAL CONTEXT 
Bankruptcy is a mechanism designed to give debtors a 
“fresh start” and to pay off debts in an orderly fashion.224 As the 
United States Supreme Court explained in 1934, “[o]ne of the 
primary purposes of the bankruptcy act is to ‘relieve the honest 
debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit 
him to start afresh . . . .’”225 Bankruptcy offers fertile ground for 
the development of procedures to guide the reallocation of wa-
ter by stakeholder groups. Like water law, bankruptcy relies on 
state law to determine the contours of relevant property rights, 
such as the debtor’s property and the creditor’s claims.226
 
 224. See Bankruptcy, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
FederalCourts/Bankruptcy.aspx (last visited Nov. 3, 2012).  
  
 225. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (quoting Williams v. 
U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554–55 (1915)). See generally DAVID 
G. EPSTEIN, BANKRUPTCY AND RELATED LAW IN A NUTSHELL (7th ed. 2005); 
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U. S. COURTS, BANKR. JUDGES DIV., BANKRUPTCY BA-
SICS (rev. 3d ed. 2011) [hereinafter BANKRUPTCY BASICS], available at http:// 
www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/FederalCourts/BankruptcyReso
urces/bankbasics2011.pdf. 
 226. EPSTEIN, supra note 225, at 123 (“Unless some federal interest re-
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The Bankruptcy Code establishes six types of bankruptcy 
mechanisms.227 The most promising avenue for comparison lies 
in Chapter 9 (and various provisions of Chapter 11 specifically 
incorporated into Chapter 9228), which applies to municipalities 
suffering from financial distress.229 Overall, Chapter 9 provides 
municipalities with a stronger measure of control than that 
provided to debtors under other provisions of the Code.230 Chap-
ter 9 bankruptcy filings are rare, representing fewer than five 
hundred cases since congressional authorization in 1937.231 But 
such filings can be noteworthy, as in the case of Orange Coun-
ty, California’s 1994 filing, which involved millions of dollars of 
debt.232
 
quires a different result, there is no reason why [property rights in the assets 
of a bankrupt’s estate] should be analyzed differently simply because an inter-
ested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.”) (quoting Butner v. Unit-
ed States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979)). Federal law also plays an important role in 
bankruptcy, providing uniform, guiding principles and procedures. See Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1330 (2006). Although federal 
law is less prominent in the context of water law, its importance has been in-
creasing to the point that some commentators note its potential to “eclipse” 
state water law. See supra notes 
 
118–24 and accompanying text. 
 227. BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 225, at 6. Four types of bankruptcy 
likely contain little that is applicable by analogy to the reallocation of water 
rights: (1) Chapter 7 liquidation (generally not available to governmental 
debtors), see id. at 14; (2) Chapter 12, adjustment of debts of a family farmer 
or fisherman with regular annual income, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1231; (3) Chapter 
13, adjustment of debts of an individual with regular income, 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 1301–1330; and (4) Chapter 15, ancillary and other cross-border cases (in-
volving situation where debtor or its property is subject to the law of a foreign 
country), 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1532.  
 228. Chapter 11 provides for the reorganization of corporations (and the 
repayment of its creditors) that wish to continue operating. See 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 1121–29. Chapter 9 specifically incorporates by reference certain provisions 
of Chapter 11. Id. § 901 (applicability of other sections of this title). Most im-
portant to judicial confirmation of a plan for reorganization is 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1129. See BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 225, at 55. 
 229. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 901–946. 
 230. As the Bankruptcy Judges Division explains: 
The role of creditors is more limited in chapter 9 than in other cases. 
There is no first meeting of creditors, and creditors may not propose 
competing plans. If certain requirements are met, the debtor’s plan is 
binding on dissenting creditors. The chapter 9 debtor has more free-
dom to operate without court-imposed restrictions. 
BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 225, at 52; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (provi-
sions concerning judicial confirmation of a plan for reorganization). 
 231. BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 225, at 49. 
 232. Id. 
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Title 11 defines municipality as a “political subdivision or 
public agency or instrumentality of a State,”233 a definition that 
fits state water agencies that have over-promised scarce water 
supplies.234 To invoke the protection of Chapter 9, a municipali-
ty must be “insolvent,”235 which means generally that it is “un-
able to pay its debts as they become due”236—a situation re-
markably similar to the lot of state water agencies that have 
overallocated water rights in a particular watershed or aqui-
fer.237 This type of bankruptcy provides a municipality with the 
opportunity to negotiate and develop a plan to reorganize and 
adjust its debts,238 a direct analogue to the stakeholder negotia-
tions and water reallocations already familiar in the context of 
water law.239 The municipality has broad powers, including the 
ability to reject executory contracts,240 which parallel water 
rights and contracts calling for deliveries of water in the fu-
ture.241
To invoke bankruptcy protection, a municipality must file a 
petition for relief.
 
242 This triggers an automatic stay that pro-
hibits creditors from seeking to enforce their claims against the 
debtor during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding.243 
The municipal debtor must file a detailed list of its creditors 
and its debts.244 Creditors, in turn, must provide specific proofs 
of their claims or interests if their debts are disputed, contin-
gent, or unliquidated.245
The debtor’s plan will recognize several classifications of 
interests.
 
246
 
 233. 11 U.S.C. § 101(40). 
 First, the plan will distinguish between “unse-
 234. For a discussion of overappropriation, see supra Part I.B. 
 235. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3). 
 236. Id. § 101(32)(C)(ii). Municipal insolvency also includes the financial 
condition where “the municipality is generally not paying its debts as they be-
come due unless such debts are the subject of a bona fide dispute.” Id. 
§ 101(32)(C)(i). 
 237. See supra Part I.B. 
 238. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 941–946; see also 11 U.S.C. § 901 (making various 
other code sections applicable to chapter 9 bankruptcy). 
 239. See supra notes 217–22 and accompanying text. 
 240. BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 225, at 53. 
 241. See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text. 
 242. 11 U.S.C. §§ 303, 901(a). 
 243. Id. §§ 362, 922. 
 244. See id. § 924; FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007.  
 245. See 11 U.S.C. § 925. 
 246. See id. § 1122. 
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cured” and “secured” debts.247 To qualify as a secured creditor 
(such as the holder of a mortgage), the claimant must be owed a 
debt that can be satisfied by the liquidation of a specific as-
set.248 In contrast, an unsecured creditor holds a “claim or debt 
for which a creditor holds no special assurance of payment.”249 
Further, unsecured claims involve credit that “was extended 
based solely upon the creditor’s assessment of the debtor’s fu-
ture ability to pay.”250
The debtor’s plan will also separate out claims that are un-
secured, yet entitled to special treatment as “priorities” or 
“preferences.”
  
251 These priorities represent a codification of in-
terests deemed important to society, such as the payment of 
claims for domestic support obligations and contributions to an 
employee benefit plan.252 Such priorities also favor essential 
pragmatic functions, such as the payment of some administra-
tive expenses of bankruptcy.253 Importantly, consistent with the 
label “priority,” the special status of these interests is correlat-
ed to the importance of the interest and not to its historical vin-
tage.254
 
 247. See generally id. § 506(a)(1) (section on “determination of secured sta-
tus”); BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 
  
225, at 75 (defining “secured debt” as 
“[d]ebt backed by a mortgage, pledge of collateral, or other lien; debt for which 
the creditor has the right to pursue specific pledged property upon default” 
(emphasis added)). 
 248. See BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 225, at 75. 
 249. Id. at 76. Unsecured claims can also arise out of some violation of legal 
rights, as in tort. A related concept is that of “undersecured claim[s]” repre-
senting a “debt secured by property that is worth less than the full amount of 
the debt.” Id. 
 250. Id.  
 251. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a). 
 252. See id. §§ 507(a)(4), 507(a)(7). 
 253. See id. § 507(a)(1). 
 254. Priority unsecured claims must be paid in full before ordinary unse-
cured claims receive anything. See BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 225, at 75 
(defining “priority claim” as an “unsecured claim that is entitled to be paid 
ahead of other unsecured claims that are not entitled to priority status” and 
explaining that “[p]priority refers to the order in which these unsecured claims 
are to be paid”). Further, “priority” refers to:  
The Bankruptcy Code’s statutory ranking of unsecured claims that 
determines the order in which unsecured claims will be paid if there 
is not enough money to pay all unsecured claims in full. For example, 
under the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme, money owed to the case 
trustee or for prepetition alimony and/or child support must be paid 
in full before any general unsecured debt (i.e. trade debt or credit card 
debt) is paid. 
Id.  
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Chapter 9’s approval of an insolvent municipality’s negoti-
ated plan to reorganize and adjust its debts provides guidance 
to water-stakeholder groups. Chapter 9 gives significant weight 
to the municipality’s suggested plan for reorganization, a focus 
appropriate in the context of water administrators’ special ex-
pertise in water allocation.255 The bankruptcy court must con-
firm the municipality’s reorganization plan if it satisfies the 
general requirements set out in the Code.256 Among other 
things, the plan must be “feasible” and “in the best interest of 
creditors,”257 which generally means that the municipality has 
made a “reasonable effort” to place its creditors in a better posi-
tion than they would be if the bankruptcy case were dis-
missed.258 If creditors’ claims under the plan are “impaired,”259 
then the plan cannot be confirmed unless at least one class of 
impaired claims accepts the plan.260 The plan for reorganization 
may provide for the reduction, impairment, alteration, and/or 
pro rata payment of creditors’ claims by repaying debts under a 
specified “cents on the dollar” formula.261 Bankruptcy also al-
lows for the subordination of senior rights to junior ones. This 
occurs “in the interest of confirmation of a plan and rehabilita-
tion of the debtor.”262 In addition, municipalities may reject, 
subject to court approval, executory contracts under which all 
duties have not yet been performed.263
B. BANKRUPTCY: THE WATER CONTEXT 
 
Traditional bankruptcy principles offer invaluable guid-
ance to water stakeholder groups. Just as the traditional pro-
cess seeks to reorganize the financial operations of distressed 
individuals, corporations, and municipalities to produce a 
 
 255. See supra note 230 and accompanying text; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1129 
(provisions concerning judicial confirmation of a plan for reorganization). 
 256. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 943(b), 1129. 
 257. Id. § 943(b)(7). 
 258. See BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 225, at 56. 
 259. “Impaired” claims, generally, are those whose legal, equitable, and 
contractual rights have been altered by the bankruptcy plan. See generally 11 
U.S.C. § 1124.  
 260. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10). But see id. § 1129(b)(1) (articulating “cram 
down” provision). 
 261. See id. § 1123(b)(1) (providing that a plan may “impair or leave unim-
paired any class of claims, secured or unsecured, or of interests”) and § 1124, 
both made applicable to Chapter 9 by 11 U.S.C. § 901. 
 262. S. REP. NO. 95-989, § 510, 95th Cong. (1978); see also 11 U.S.C. 
§ 510(a) (recognizing enforceability of subordination agreements). 
 263. See BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 225, at 53. 
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healthier and more sustainable economic future, so also might 
water bankruptcy reorganize the liquid assets of a region to 
produce healthier and more sustainable watersheds. The fol-
lowing subsections highlight, respectively, the mechanics of wa-
ter bankruptcy and three contexts for which it is best suited.  
1. The Mechanics of Water Bankruptcy 
Declaration of insolvency. To qualify for the protection of 
bankruptcy, a municipality must be “insolvent,” or unable to 
pay its debts as they become due.264 In its petition for relief, a 
water bankrupt agency would likely demonstrate that a partic-
ular watershed or aquifer is over-appropriated to a degree that 
both agency and stakeholders deem unacceptable.265 This could 
occur when a significant number of water users, including 
those holding senior priorities, agree that the current system is 
on the verge of collapse.266 In some cases, state lawmakers may 
effectively issue a declaration of insolvency and petition for re-
lief through legislation calling for widespread water reform to 
forestall the collapse of the entire system.267
Articulation of goals. The goal of traditional bankruptcy is 
to give the debtor a fresh start through a systematic and com-
prehensive reorganization of its debts.
  
268 For meaningful dis-
cussions among water stakeholders, there must be widespread 
frustration with the current allocation of water sufficient to 
trigger a negotiated departure from priority allocation.269 That 
is, the collaborators must agree that they are seeking a sus-
tainable allocation of water through a non-traditional approach 
and that they are willing to bargain away some benefits of pri-
ority in exchange for other perceived advantages, such as secu-
rity or sustainability.270 In some cases, state legislation might 
articulate collaborative goals, rather than a winner-takes-all 
approach to the resolution of competing claims.271
 
 264. See supra note 
 Lacking such 
a consensus, the water users’ complaints could be resolved 
235–36 and accompanying text. 
 265. See supra Part I.B. 
 266. See supra note 219. 
 267. The Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Reform Act of 2009 provides an 
example of such legislation. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 268. See supra note 224 and accompanying text. 
 269. See supra note 219. 
 270. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 271. For example, in 2009 California’s state regulatory agencies called for 
widespread reform to achieve two legislatively-articulated “coequal goals.” See 
infra Part III.C.2. 
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more efficiently through traditional channels of judicial and 
administration dispute resolution. 
Listing of debts and creditors. To support its petition for re-
lief, a traditional debtor must provide a list of its creditors and 
its debts.272
Providing proof of claims. Would-be creditors must submit 
specific proofs of claim in the context of traditional bankruptcy 
if their claims are “disputed, contingent, or unliquidated.”
 Likewise, insolvent state water agencies would be 
required to produce a detailed list of all valid water rights, in-
cluding the volumes of appropriation, purposes of use, places of 
use, and identity of the water users. In jurisdictions that do not 
keep detailed records of water rights and beneficial use, this 
requirement would be difficult to satisfy, and a negotiated list 
of debts and creditors might be produced as a substitute for of-
ficial state records. 
273 
Similarly, creditors in water bankruptcy would be required to 
demonstrate the extent to which they had actually put their 
water rights to beneficial, non-wasteful, consumptive use.274 
The difference between the face value of water rights and the 
volume of historic consumptive use would be subject potentially 
to abandonment.275 In addition, such proofs would be required 
of those holding “conditional” water rights, as the counterpart 
to traditional contingent claims.276
Distribution of assets. Traditional bankruptcy classifies 
valid interests as “secured” or “unsecured.”
 
277 The former will 
be satisfied in order of temporal priority by the liquidation of a 
specific asset (such as a home secured by a mortgage).278 Unse-
cured claims, in contrast, may receive pro rata distributions in 
partial satisfaction of the debt.279
 
 272. See supra note 
 Unsecured claimants, there-
fore, will share the loss regardless of the year in which their 
claims arose. In the context of water bankruptcy, the distinc-
tion between secured and unsecured claims provides rich 
ground for stakeholder discussion and negotiation. Senior ap-
propriators would likely argue that their water rights consti-
244 and accompanying text. 
 273. See supra note 245 and accompanying text. 
 274. See supra notes 172–76 and accompanying text. 
 275. See GETCHES, NUTSHELL supra note 24. 
 276. See id. 
 277. See supra note 247 and accompanying text. 
 278. See id. 
 279. See supra notes 247–50 and accompanying text. 
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tute secured claims entitled to early satisfaction.280 Environ-
mental interests might agree, and further claim that environ-
mental uses should be recognized as senior claims that predate 
all others.281 Junior appropriators, in contrast, might assert 
that water rights are unsecured claims because they are 
usufructuary in nature, and not attached to any particular 
molecule of water for their satisfaction.282 Further, juniors 
might argue that water rights relying on future precipitation 
(including most sources other than aquifers gradually filled 
over the course of years, decades, or even centuries) constitute 
a natural counterpart to unsecured financial claims that de-
pend on debtors’ future ability to pay.283 As a consequence, if 
water rights constitute secured claims, then the distribution of 
assets may follow a scheme that mirrors the prior appropria-
tion doctrine; but if water rights are treated as unsecured 
claims, then the pro rata distribution of assets might resemble 
riparianism,284
The debtor’s plan for reorganization may elect to provide 
special treatment for important social or pragmatic interests 
labeled as “preferences.”
 rather than the priority doctrine. 
285 In parallel fashion, water bankrupt-
cy stakeholders must determine whether one type of human 
use (agricultural irrigation or urban water supply, for example) 
should be given preferential treatment over others. Similarly, 
environmental stakeholders would likely make the case that 
environmental debts such as the protection of minimum stream 
flows should be considered as important to society as the pref-
erences protected in bankruptcy.286
 
 280. See supra note 
 In support of this claim, en-
vironmentalists might argue that base level stream flows are 
essential to wet the riverbed and to facilitate physical deliver-
138 and accompanying text. 
 281. See Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms, Inc., 529 
P.2d 1321, 1325 (Colo. 1974) (rejecting argument that water-loving trees 
known as “phreatophytes” predated senior water rights in the Arkansas River 
watershed). 
 282. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 283. See supra note 250 and accompanying text. 
 284. See supra notes 66, 279–81 and accompanying text. 
 285. See supra notes 251–54 and accompanying text. 
 286. See supra note 281 and accompanying text. In some cases, western 
water law already elevates the protection of stream flows above other inter-
ests. See, e.g., Michael F. Browning, Instream Flow Water Rights in the West-
ern States and Provinces, 56 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 9–1, 9–29 (2010) (de-
scribing the concept of “upside-down” water rights, which “quantify how much 
water should be allowed to be diverted for development, and protect all re-
maining flows” for instream and environmental purposes). 
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ies of water, without which the entire water system might col-
lapse.287
2. The Context of Water Bankruptcy 
 Thus, they would conclude that instream flows and 
other environmental debts should be considered as important 
to society as the priorities and preferences protected in bank-
ruptcy.  
There are at least three contexts in which water bankrupt-
cy could provide invaluable guidance to water users facing 
seemingly insurmountable problems. As an essential prerequi-
site, there must widespread acknowledgement that the current 
system is unsustainable and, indeed, that the entire watershed 
may be on the verge of collapse.288 Equally important, stake-
holders must come willingly and voluntarily to negotiate a 
work-around of the priority doctrine in the hope of achieving a 
more certain, stable, and satisfactory allocation of limited wa-
ter resources.289
Allocating groundwater. The priority doctrine has proved 
unequal to the task of groundwater administration.
 
290 Even the 
stalwart appropriative jurisdiction of Colorado does not apply 
the doctrine strictly to its groundwater resources: rather, Colo-
rado modifies the prior appropriation doctrine “to permit the 
full economic development” of so-called “designated” groundwa-
ter resources.291 Additionally, in the case of “nontributary” 
groundwater, Colorado departs from the priority doctrine en-
tirely, instead allocating the resource on the basis of ownership 
of the overlying land.292
Today, in various aquifers, there is widespread agreement 
that current practices are not sustainable. When surface water 
supplies are inadequate in the seven-state Colorado River ba-
  
 
 287. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 288. See supra note 18. 
 289. See id. 
 290. See John D. Leshy, The Federal Role in Managing the Nation’s 
Groundwater, 11 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2004) (“State 
law generally has not been adequate to the task of managing the nation’s 
groundwater” and it remains a subject about which “‘misinformation, misun-
derstanding, and mysticism’ abound, and the law that governs it is murky.” 
(quoting NAT’L WATER COMM’N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 230 
(1973))); see also Joseph L. Sax, We Don’t Do Groundwater: A Morsel of Cali-
fornia Legal History, 6 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 269, 271 (2003). 
 291. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-102(1) (2011). 
 292. See id. § 37-90-102(2). 
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sin,293 for example, water users make up the difference by 
pumping groundwater. Because groundwater supplies typically 
are not fully replenished annually, such pumping is unsustain-
able. As concluded by a 2011 study, “In the U.S. Southwest . . . 
there is less rain and snowfall each year than the amount of 
water used in the region. Today that shortfall is made up for by 
pumping groundwater, well beyond the sustainable rate.”294 
The reports concludes ominously, “[a]dd the impacts of growing 
population and incomes, and the Southwest will face a major 
water crisis in the coming decades.”295 Other major aquifers 
face similar threats from unsustainable practices, including 
portions of the Ogallala Aquifer beneath Kansas and Texas,296 
Nebraska groundwater,297 and the aquifer underlying the Cen-
tral Valley of California.298
Allocating interstate rivers. The Colorado River Basin pro-
vides the paradigmatic example of a watershed amenable to 
principles of water bankruptcy. In 1922, the seven states of the 
Colorado River basin entered into the Colorado River Com-
  
 
 293. See infra note 312 and accompanying text. 
 294. ANDREW FREEDMAN, Report Warns of Worsening Western Water Cri-
sis, CLIMATE CENTRAL (Feb. 14, 2011), http://www.climatecentral.org/blogs/ 
report-warns-of-worsening-western-water-crisis/ (quoting FRANK ACKERMAN & 
ELIZABETH A. STANTON, STOCKHOLM ENV’T INST., THE LAST DROP: CLIMATE 
CHANGE AND THE SOUTHWEST WATER CRISIS 4 (2011), available at http://sei-
international.org/publications?pid=1843. 
 295. Id. 
 296. See Groundwater Depletion in Semiarid Regions of Texas and Califor-
nia Threatens U.S. Food Security, UNIV. OF TEXAS (May 29, 2012), 
http://www.utexas.edu/news/2012/05/29/groundwater/ (describing results of 
study published in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences which, in-
ter alia, predicts that current rates of agricultural irrigation in portions of the 
High Plains are unsustainable for more than another few decades); see also 
Pete Spotts, Southern Great Plains Could Run Out of Groundwater in 30 
Years, Study Finds, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 30, 2012, availa-
ble at http://www.csmonitor.com/Environment/2012/0530/Southern-Great 
-Plains-could-run-out-of-groundwater-in-30-years-study-finds. 
 297. See J. David Aiken, The Western Common Law of Tributary Ground-
water: Implications for Nebraska, 84 NEB. L. REV. 541, 542 (2004) (“Nebraska 
water law is on a collision course with reality. For decades Nebraska judges 
and water policy makers have ignored the hydrologic connection between sur-
face water and tributary groundwater, the groundwater that provides the 
stream’s base flow.”). 
 298. See Spotts, supra note 296. The problem is not confined to western 
aquifers. See generally Patrik Jonsson, Drought: Farmers Dig Deeper, Water 
Tables Drop, Competition Heats Up: A Drier “New Normal” Is Forcing U.S. 
Farmers to Dig Deeper Wells, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Aug. 8, 2012 (de-
scribing aquifer declines up to forty feet in Georgia due, in significant part, to 
increased agricultural irrigation). 
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pact,299 an agreement intended to allocate the great river in a 
way that would satisfy the present and projected needs of both 
the Upper Division states (Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and 
Wyoming)300 and the Lower Division states (Arizona, California, 
and Nevada).301 The Upper Division states joined the negotia-
tion out of fear that the western doctrine of prior appropria-
tion—the basis of water allocation within each state’s borders—
would be applied also to the interstate allocation of the river.302 
Because the upper states were slower to develop than their 
downstream sisters, application of the priority doctrine would 
assign less-reliable, junior water rights to the upstream 
states.303 The downstream states, for their part, sought the po-
litical cooperation of their upstream neighbors in lobbying Con-
gress for the federal funding necessary to construct dams and 
reservoirs on the lower Colorado River, infrastructure that 
would provide a direct benefit to California irrigators.304
 
 299. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, 
COLORADO RIVER COMPACT (1922), available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/ 
g1000/pdfiles/crcompct.pdf. 
 Thus, 
all states entered into negotiations voluntarily, because they 
worried that the status quo would not be sustainable in light of 
their interests. As the upper states hoped, the resulting agree-
ment rejected the interstate application of the priority doctrine. 
Instead, the parties allocated the river’s flow roughly equally 
 300. See id. at Article II(c). In 1948, the Upper Basin states further allocat-
ed their share of the river among themselves. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, 
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN COMPACT (1948), 
available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g1000/pdfiles/ucbsnact.pdf. 
 301. See COLORADO RIVER COMPACT, supra note 299, at Article II(d). In 
1928, legislation authorizing the Boulder Canyon Project effectively allocated 
the Colorado River among the Lower Basin states. See Arizona v. California, 
283 U.S. 423, 448–49 (1931) (beginning a line of numerous related Supreme 
Court cases with the same name). See generally U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, 
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, THE ARIZONA V. CALIFORNIA U.S. SUPREME COURT 
DECISION OF 1964, http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/pao/lawofrvr.html (docu-
menting current seniors with private claims and each state’s allocation of wa-
ter beginning 1964) (last visited Nov. 3, 2012). 
 302. See James S. Lochhead, An Upper Basin Perspective on California’s 
Claims to Water from the Colorado River Part I: The Law of the River, 4 U. 
DENV. WATER L. REV. 290, 297–99 (2001) (arguing that the Upper Basin states 
feared that Supreme Court precedent would allow the Lower Basin states to 
“obtain permanent preferential rights to water simply by developing faster” 
and that they entered into a compact to “eliminate the application of the prior 
appropriation doctrine on an interstate basis”). 
 303. See id. at 297; see, e.g., Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 502 (1922) 
(applying the doctrine of prior appropriation to allocate the use of an inter-
state river among two states that applied the doctrine on an intrastate basis). 
 304. See Lochhead, supra note 302, at 293–94. 
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among upstream and downstream states.305 In particular, the 
upper states pledged to deliver a rolling average of 7.5 million 
acre-feet (maf) of water each year to their downstream sister 
states.306
This arrangement might have worked well enough, but for 
an error of storied proportions: the negotiators assumed that 
river flows of their era (about 16.4 maf, which provided a com-
fortable margin beyond the Upper Division’s entitlement to 7.5 
maf and the Lower Division’s entitlement to another 7.5 maf) 
were representative and would continue into the indefinite fu-
ture.
  
307 Unfortunately, this assumption was not accurate,308 and 
the Compact stems from an overly-optimistic, inflated estimate 
of actual river flows, which plagued the states for almost a cen-
tury. In 2007, when drought threatened the sustainability of 
the seven states’ water supply from the Colorado, they again 
turned to negotiation rather than the priority doctrine.309 The 
result was an agreement executed by the Secretary of the Inte-
rior and the seven states that set forth a twenty-year plan for 
conserving, sharing, and cooperating during drought.310
 
 305. See COLORADO RIVER COMPACT, supra note 
 Accord-
ing to one water manager, the seven states have perfected a co-
operative ethic of interstate sharing that supplants the doctrine 
299, at Article III(a) (ap-
portioning in perpetuity the exclusive beneficial consumptive use of 7.5 million 
acre-feet of water per annum to the Upper Basin and of 7.5 million acre-feet of 
water per annum to the Lower Basin, with certain specified adjustments). 
 306. See id. at Article III(d). In 1944, the United States pledged to allocate 
1.5 million acre-feet annually to Mexico. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BU-
REAU OF RECLAMATION, UTILIZATION OF WATERS OF THE COLORADO AND 
TIJUANA RIVERS AND OF THE RIO GRANDE, TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA AND MEXICO, Article 10(a) (1944), available at 
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g1000/pdfiles/mextrety.pdf. 
 307. See COLORADO RIVER COMPACT, supra note 299, at Article III(a). 
 308. See Robert W. Adler, Revisiting the Colorado River Compact: Time for 
a Change?, 28 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 19, 30 (2008) (explaining that 
the basin states negotiated the compact based on the 1899–1920 hydrologic 
record when annual Colorado River flows averaged 16.5 million acre feet, a 
period much wetter than the rest of the twentieth century, during which aver-
age annual river flows declined to 15 maf (1896–2004) and to 14 maf (1922–
1982)).  
 309. See generally DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, 
RECORD OF DECISION: COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES FOR LOWER BA-
SIN SHORTAGES AND THE COORDINATED OPERATIONS FOR LAKE POWELL AND 
LAKE MEAD 1 (Dec. 13, 2007) available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/ 
programs/strategies/RecordofDecision.pdf. 
 310. See id. at 3. 
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of priority practiced within their borders311
More recently, the impacts of climate change and drought 
led some to conclude, once again, that the current approach in 
the Colorado basin was not sustainable.
—an approach that 
is consistent with the principles of water bankruptcy. 
312 In response, some 
have called for renegotiation of the Colorado River Compact,313 
while others have disagreed.314 Notably absent, however, are 
calls for the application of the priority doctrine on an interstate 
basis.315
 
 311. See Patricia Mulroy, Collaboration and the Colorado River Compact, 8 
NEV. L.J. 890, 894 (2008). Mulroy asserts:  
 
The seven states of the Colorado River Basin have spent much of the 
past century working through some of the most complex, contentious 
water resource issues imaginable. . . . Yet their collective experience 
demonstrates the profound value of working together to resolve seem-
ingly intractable problems, rather than resorting to litigation or the 
kind of protracted conflict or competition that results in winners, los-
ers, or nothing at all. By embracing the need for cooperation and 
partnership implicit in the Compact, balancing our competing needs 
and demands, and reaching out to share our experiences and solu-
tions with others who are facing similar challenges, the seven basin 
states are setting new standards for resource management that will 
see our communities—and the Colorado River—through events such 
as the drought and climate change well into the future. 
Id. at 894. 
 312. Tim P. Barnett & David W. Pierce, When Will Lake Mead Go Dry?, 44 
WATER RES. RESEARCH 1, 1 (2008), available at http://www.agu.org/pubs/ 
crossref/2008/2007WR006704.shtml (citing forecasts that runoff to the Colora-
do basin may decline ten to thirty percent over the next thirty to fifty years, 
potentially affecting the water supply of 12 to 36 million people, and conclud-
ing that “[w]hen expected changes due to global warming are included as well, 
currently scheduled depletions are simply not sustainable”).  
 313. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 308, at 22 (arguing that “significant chang-
es in circumstances, new information, and problems and omissions in the orig-
inal agreement suggest that it is time to reconsider some key provisions of the 
compact,” in part because “[w]e understand more about the environmental im-
pacts of dams and water diversions [and] the public generally places a higher 
value on environmental protection . . . .”); Elana Schor, McCain Comments on 
Colorado River Compact Makes Waves in Western States, GUARDIAN, Aug. 20, 
2008, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/20/ 
johnmccain.water (quoting comments of then-Republican presidential candi-
date John McCain suggesting that the Compact should be re-negotiated). 
 314. See, e.g., Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Colorado River Compact Entitlements, 
Clearing Up Misconceptions, 28 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 83, 104 
(2008) (“Recent experience in developing interim shortage criteria and partici-
pating in the [endangered species] recovery plan is showing that the Colorado 
River Compact is not in need of any amendment.”). 
 315. One prominent report concluded, “[t]he states have entered into 26 
interstate water allocation compacts, primarily in the western United States, 
most of them over 50 years ago. As interstate water conflicts have increased, 
so has the realization that most of the existing compacts appear to be inade-
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Allocating intrastate rivers and aquifers. The next subsec-
tion considers yet another context in which water bankruptcy 
might prove beneficial: intrastate negotiations among agricul-
tural, urban, environmental, and other interests in light of the 
requirements of the federal Endangered Species Act. 
C. CASE STUDY: A PERFECT STORM IN CALIFORNIA316
The California Bay-Delta provides an example of a water-
shed that is widely perceived to be on the verge of collapse.
 
317 In 
fact, in 2009, the state legislature proclaimed, “[t]he Legisla-
ture finds and declares . . . [t]he Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta 
watershed and California’s water infrastructure are in crisis 
and existing Delta policies are not sustainable.”318 In response, 
the legislature created a new state agency and charged it with 
presiding over a collaborative effort to increase reliability of 
water supplies and to enhance the ecosystem.319
 
quate to resolve these conflicts.” Jerome C. Muys et al., Utton Transboundary 
Resources Center Model Interstate Water Compact, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 17, 
21 (2007). In response, the report suggests a model compact that the states 
could adopt. Id. 
 
 316. This section was inspired, in part, by the author’s participation as a 
member of National Research Council’s Committee on Sustainable Water and 
Environmental Management in the California Bay-Delta, and as a member of 
the Panel to Review California’s Draft Bay-Delta Conservation Plan. See gen-
erally COMM. ON SUSTAINABLE WATER AND ENVTL. MGMT. IN THE CAL. BAY-
DELTA, SUSTAINABLE WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN THE 
CALIFORNIA BAY-DELTA (2012), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php? 
record_id=13394 (last visited Nov. 3, 2012); COMM. ON SUSTAINABLE WATER 
AND ENVTL. MGMT. IN THE CAL. BAY-DELTA, A SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT OF AL-
TERNATIVES FOR REDUCING WATER MANAGEMENT EFFECTS ON THREATENED 
AND ENDANGERED FISHES IN CAL.’S BAY DELTA (2010), available at http://www 
.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12881 (last visited Nov. 3, 2012); PANEL TO 
REVIEW CALIFORNIA’S DRAFT BAY-DELTA CONSERVATION PLAN, A REVIEW OF 
THE USE OF SCIENCE AND ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT IN CALIFORNIA’S DRAFT 
BAY-DELTA CONSERVATION PLAN (2011), available at http://www.nap.edu/ 
catalog.php?record_id=13148 (last visited Nov. 3, 2012).  
 317. See, e.g., BEAU GOLDIE, SANTA CLARA VALLEY WATER DISTRICT ET AL., 
Restoring the Delta, Protecting Our Future, http://www.valleywater.org/ 
EkContent.aspx?id=8272 (click on attachment “Restoring the Delta–Protecting 
our Future”) (quoting a statement from the Public Policy Institute of Califor-
nia that “California’s current water system raises several red flags. Cata-
strophic interruptions of water supplies from earthquakes and floods could 
cause large short-term losses; unreliable supplies could also jeopardize busi-
ness and infrastructure investments that support economic growth”) (last vis-
ited Nov. 3, 2012). 
 318. Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Reform Act of 2009, CAL. WATER CODE 
§ 85001(a) (West 2009), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/ 
calawquery?codesection=wat. 
 319. See infra notes 347–48 and accompanying text. 
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1. Water Rights in California 
California practices a blend of riparian water law (the 
common law in the East) and western prior appropriation, with 
both systems subject to the constitutional requirement of rea-
sonable and beneficial use.320 Riparian rights must be satisfied 
first.321 Then administrators allocate the remaining supply, if 
any, among appropriators in order of temporal priority.322 In 
some cases, the State Water Board may modify existing appro-
priative water rights under a centuries-old policy known as the 
public trust doctrine.323
Two governmental appropriators are particularly signifi-
cant: the federal Bureau of Reclamation (Bureau) and the Cali-
fornia Department of Water Resources (DWR). The Bureau op-
erates the Central Valley Project (CVP), a massive system of 
water storage and delivery authorized in 1935.
 
324 The CVP is a 
multi-purpose project, with a significant portion of its water go-
ing to agricultural users.325 California operates the State Water 
Project (SWP), which began operation in the 1960s.326
 
 320. See CAL. CONST., art. 10, § 2 (West 2012). 
 Like its 
 321. See Tulare Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Dist., 45 P.2d 972, 976 (Cal. 
1935). But see In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys., 599 P.2d 656, 
676 (Cal. 1979) (upholding restrictions on the exercise of dormant riparian 
rights). 
 322. See Tulare Dist., 45 P.2d at 976. 
 323. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 
709, 712 (Cal. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983) (recognizing state’s con-
tinuing jurisdiction over flowing waters, tidelands, and lakeshores for the pur-
pose of protecting the public’s interest in fishing, navigation, commerce, and 
resource preservation); State Water Res. Control Bd. Cases, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
189.272 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); see also supra Part II.A.4. 
 324. See The Central Valley Project, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU 
OF RECLAMATION, http://www.usbr.gov/mp/cvp/index.html (last modified Sept. 
28, 2010). See generally Reed D. Benson, New Adventures of the Old Bureau: 
Modern-Day Reclamation Statutes and Congress’s Unfinished Environmental 
Business, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 137, 152 (2011) (discussing the history of the 
Bureau of Reclamation and introducing some background on the CVP); Lloyd 
G. Carter, Reaping Riches in a Wretched Region: Subsidized Industrial Farm-
ing and its Link to Perpetual Poverty, 3 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 5, 6 
(2009) (explaining that the CVP is the largest publicly funded water manage-
ment system in the United States); Tarlock, The Future, supra note 91, at 
776–80 (giving some background on water law in the west, prior appropria-
tion, and the public trust doctrine). 
 325. See Central Valley Project: General Description, U.S. DEP’T OF THE IN-
TERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, http://www.usbr.gov/projects/Project.jsp? 
proj_Name=Central+Valley+Project (last modified Apr. 21, 2011). 
 326. See California State Water Project Water Contractors, CAL. DEPART-
MENT WATER RESSOURCES, http://www.water.ca.gov/swp/contractor_intro.cfm 
(last modified Apr. 29, 2008). 
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sister project,327 the SWP is multi-purpose and supplies both 
municipal and agricultural users.328 The Bureau and the State 
hold water rights for the operation of these projects, which they 
have contractually committed to deliver to numerous water-
user groups.329 The water rights held by the Bureau and the 
State for the operation of these projects are relatively junior by 
California standards.330 As a result, they—and the contract de-
liveries dependent on such water rights—are vulnerable to cur-
tailment in times of shortage.331
2. Stakeholder Negotiations in the California Bay-Delta 
 
The California Bay-Delta is one of the nation’s most critical 
aquatic regions, and includes the largest estuary along the west 
coast of North and South America.332 The confluence of the Sac-
ramento and San Joaquin Rivers (the Delta) lies less than fifty 
miles northeast of San Francisco. To the west and southwest of 
the confluence, the rivers’ freshwater gives way to the saline 
waters of San Francisco Bay. The San-Joaquin River Delta and 
San Francisco Bay (together, the Bay-Delta) represent the 
“hub” of the water-delivery system for the entire state of Cali-
fornia that provides drinking water for more than twenty mil-
lion citizens,333
 
 327. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, supra 
note 
 irrigation water that supports a $28 billion agri-
cultural industry in central California, and a commercial and 
325 (explaining federal/state coordination of the CVP and SWP facilities). 
 328. See CAL. DEPARTMENT WATER RESOURCES, supra note 326 (explaining 
that SWP water goes to 24 municipal contractors and to 5 agricultural users). 
 329. See generally Planning & Conservation League v. Dep’t of Water Res., 
100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 173, 178 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (discussing long term contracts 
between the California Department of Water Resources and several local wa-
ter contractors). 
 330. See California State Water Project Water Rights, CAL. DEPARTMENT 
WATER RESOURCES, http://www.water.ca.gov/swp/waterrights.cfm (last modi-
fied Apr. 29, 2008) (specifying that the appropriations date back to 1927). 
 331. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing curtailment of junior priorities) and 
supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text (discussing full- and over-
appropriation of California’s water supply). 
 332. ISENBERG, supra note 5, at 2 (describing Bay-Delta as “one of the most 
significant ecosystems in the world”); Welcome to the Delta, CALFED BAY-
DELTA PROGRAM ARCHIVED WEBSITE, http://calwater.ca.gov/delta/index.html 
(last visited Nov. 3, 2012) (describing the Delta as “the largest estuary on the 
western coast of the Americas”). 
 333. JAMES NICKLES ET AL., CALIFORNIA’S BAY-DELTA: USGS SCIENCE 
SUPPORTS DECISION MAKING, FACT SHEET 2010-3032 (2010), available at 
http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2010/3032. 
  
2012] WATER BANKRUPTCY 615 
 
recreational fishing industry valued at hundreds of millions of 
dollars.334
But the system is in crisis. As California acknowledges, the 
Delta provides “a lush habitat for plants and animals, many of 
which are found only in the Delta. Unfortunately, many of the 
Delta species have been declared threatened or endangered.”
  
335 
Large portions of the region’s historical wetland habitats have 
been destroyed.336
Decades of environmental degradation have led to severe declines in 
Delta fisheries and have contributed to the collapse of the State of 
California’s . . . salmon fishing industry. The State is in the third year 
of drought with the consequent decreased water supplies contributing 
further to the problems. Both the Bay-Delta ecosystem and the econ-
omy dependent on its water and fish are on the precipice of collapse. 
Furthermore, climate change and seismic risks present additional, se-
rious threats to the Bay-Delta environment, the levees and the Delta 
communities that depend on them, as well as the water supplies that 
travel through the Bay-Delta.
 Federal agencies involved in the Delta paint 
a bleak picture. In 2009, they composed a list of the Delta’s 
problems: 
337
For decades, California has searched for a solution to the 
Bay-Delta’s woes, and a method to resolve the seemingly in-
tractable conflict among agricultural, environmental, fishery, 
urban, and other water users,
 
338 and between state and federal 
regulatory authorities.339 In late 1994, state and federal repre-
sentatives signed the Bay-Delta Accord,340
 
 334. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR ET AL., CALIFORNIA BAY-DELTA MEMO-
RANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING AMONG FEDERAL AGENCIES § I(a) (Sept. 29, 
2009), available at 
 giving rise to a col-
laborative process known as “CALFED” (the name of which 
http://www.doi.gov/documents/BayDeltaMOUSigned.pdf. 
 335. Delta Species of Concern, CALFED BAY-DELTA PROGRAM ARCHIVED 
WEBSITE, http://www.calwater.ca.gov/delta/species/index.html (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2012). In 1993, the federal Fish and Wildlife Service listed the Delta 
smelt as a “threatened species” under the Endangered Species Act, and the 
National Marine Fisheries Service listed the winter-run Chinook salmon as a 
threatened species.  
 336. See ISENBERG, supra note 5, at 4. 
 337. CALIFORNIA BAY-DELTA MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING AMONG 
FEDERAL AGENCIES, supra note 334 (emphasis added).  
 338. See Elizabeth Ann Rieke, The Bay-Delta Accord: A Stride Toward Sus-
tainability, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 341, 342–45 (1996) (discussing the debate over 
sustainability and water quality standards in the Bay-Delta). 
 339. See id. at 345–48. 
 340. See STATE OF CALIFORNIA ET AL., PRINCIPLES FOR AGREEMENT ON 
BAY-DELTA STANDARDS BETWEEN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA AND THE FEDER-
AL GOVERNMENT 1 (Dec. 15, 1994), available at http://www.calwater.ca.gov/ 
content/Documents/library/SFBayDeltaAgreement.pdf. 
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suggests the collaboration between California and federal agen-
cies). The California legislature described CALFED as “the 
largest, most comprehensive water management program in 
the world.”341 Soon after validating CALFED, the legislature 
called on its participants “to develop a long-term solution to 
water management, environmental, and other problems in the 
bay-delta watershed by means of a programmatic environmen-
tal impact statement . . . .”342 Despite its optimistic scope, 
CALFED began to fall apart by about 2005.343 Sifting through 
the ruins, one scholar suggested that CALFED’s downfall was 
its attempt to do the near-impossible: “manag[e] a dynamic, 
oversubscribed resource to provide increased consumption, in-
creased protection, and increased reliability . . . .”344 In sum, 
CALFED tried to be all things to everyone, as suggested by its 
slogan, “everyone will get better together.”345
CALFED was superseded by yet another collaborative pro-
cess, even more optimistic and sweeping than its predecessor. 
In 2009, the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Reform Act man-
dated that water officials come up with a plan to achieve the 
“coequal goals” of simultaneously providing a more reliable wa-
ter supply for water users, while also protecting, restoring, and 
enhancing the critical ecosystem from which those supplies will 
be drawn, the Bay-Delta.
  
346
 
 341. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD. ET AL., CALFED BAY-DELTA PRO-
GRAMMATIC RECORD OF DECISION 1 (Aug. 28, 2000) available at http://calwater 
.ca.gov/content/documents/ROD.pdf.  
 In addition, the legislature called 
 342. CAL. WATER CODE § 79190 (West 2009). See generally Jody Freeman 
& Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795 
(2005) (discussing the “modular” concept of environmental regulation and us-
ing CALFED as a case study); Dave Owen, Law, Environmental Dynamism, 
Reliability: The Rise and Fall of CALFED, 37 ENVTL. L. 1145, 1157–65, 1208–
14 (2007) (explaining traditional frameworks in regulating scarce resources 
and suggesting a new one); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Markets for Nature, 25 
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 261, 307–09 (2000) (suggesting CALFED 
as a constrained version of an environmental brokerage approach of regula-
tion). 
 343. See Owen, supra note 342, at 1150. 
 344. See id. at 1199–1200 (arguing that CALFED’s fatal flaw was its as-
sumption that water not legally committed to protection of the environment 
must be delivered to water users). 
 345. Sue McClurg, Delta Deal?, WESTERN WATER MAG., Jul./Aug. 2000, 
available at http://www.watereducation.org/doc.asp?id=927. 
 346. The California Delta is the region where the Sacramento and San 
Joaquin Rivers meet. As explained by the Delta Stewardship Council, the 
agency charged by statute with overseeing the achievement of the co-equal 
goals, “Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta is a regional, state and national treas-
ure that supplies the drinking water of about 25 million Californians.” It is 
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for satisfaction of the coequal goals “in a manner that protects 
and enhances the unique cultural, recreational, natural re-
source, and agricultural values” of the Delta.347 The legislature 
placed those duties on the shoulders of a newly created inde-
pendent state agency—the Delta Stewardship Council.348 The 
chair of the Stewardship Council recognized that many viewed 
the new legislation as California’s “most significant water poli-
cy step in almost 50 years.”349
3. Litigation in California 
 But without a coherent frame-
work to support the reallocation of water, rather than mere 
feel-good language calling for the satisfaction of wide-ranging 
goals, the Delta Stewardship Council lacked an important safe-
guard against the problems that eventually led to its predeces-
sor’s demise. 
At least two bodies of federal law have played an important 
role in the allocation of water rights in California. First, under 
section 7 of the ESA, federal agencies must “insure that any ac-
tion authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency” is not 
likely to jeopardize endangered species or adversely modify 
their critical habitat.350 Pursuant to its responsibilities under 
the ESA, federal wildlife agencies issued “biological opinions,” 
concluding that certain “reasonable and prudent alternatives” 
to the proposed operation of the CVP and SWP would be neces-
sary to protect endangered fish species in central California, in-
cluding restrictions on the timing and volume of water diver-
sions.351 The restrictions set off a torrent of criticism by water 
users and prompted a spate of lawsuits beginning in the 1990s 
challenging the biological opinions under the ESA.352
 
also the home to more than 515,000 people and “the hub of state, federal and 
local water systems that provide at least a portion of the water supply needs 
for two-thirds of all Californians.” The Delta, DELTA STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, 
http://www.deltacouncil.ca.gov/delta (last visited Nov. 3, 2012); see supra Part 
III.C. 
  
 347. CAL. WATER CODE § 85054 (West 2009). 
 348. See id. § 85200(a). 
 349. ISENBERG, supra note 5, at 1. 
 350. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1973). 
 351. Benson, supra note 204, at 558–59. 
 352. See generally Reed D. Benson, Environmental Review of Western Wa-
ter Project Operations: Where NEPA Has Not Applied, Will It Now Protect 
Farmers from Fish?, 29 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 269 (2011); Brian E. Gray, 
Dividing the Waters: The California Experience, 14 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1297 (2008); Shelley Ross Saxer, Managing Water Rights 
Using Fishing Rights as a Model, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 91 (2011); J.B. Ruhl & 
  
618 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:560 
 
In addition, the restrictions spawned litigation in which ir-
rigators deprived of some of their water deliveries under con-
tracts with the federal Bureau of Reclamation and the State 
Department of Water Resources claimed that the restrictions 
constituted a regulatory taking of their water rights for which 
compensation was owed.353 The irrigators prevailed in their 
2001 lawsuit, representing the first time that a court held that 
actions required under the ESA could constitute a regulatory 
taking of water rights.354
D. THE BENEFITS OF WATER BANKRUPTCY 
 
California’s series of collaborative processes provides a case 
study for the concept of water bankruptcy. This section sug-
gests three concrete, practical benefits that water-bankruptcy 
principles could produce in the context of California’s Bay-
Delta. Overall, the bankruptcy model provides a roadmap to di-
rect the discussion of stakeholder groups. As such, it may facili-
tate the consideration of tough questions in dire circumstances. 
1. Establishing Realistic Expectations 
Declaring water insolvency in the Bay-Delta would perform 
an important signaling function that would address one of the 
primary challenges faced in bankrupt watersheds: admitting 
that the current system is broken and demonstrating willing-
ness to compromise in light of such collapse.355
 
Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 MINN. L. REV. 
424 (2010); Paul Stanton Kibel, The Public Trust Navigates California’s Bay 
Delta, 51 NAT. RESOURCES J. 35 (2011); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Uncertainty 
and Markets in Water Resources, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 117, 124–25 (2005). 
 When asked to 
review the sustainability of water and environmental manage-
ment practices in the Bay-Delta, the National Research Council 
of the National Academies of Science cited as a primary road-
block the state’s failure to acknowledge scarcity:  
 353. See Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. 
Cl. 313 (Fed. Cl. 2001). See generally Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Fish, 
Farms, and the Clash of Cultures in the Klamath Basin, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 279 
(2003) (describing “clash of cultures” among farmers, environmentalists, Na-
tive Americans, and federal agencies in the Klamath region of northern Cali-
fornia and southern Oregon). 
 354. See Benson, supra note 204; see also Douglas L. Grant, ESA Reduc-
tions in Reclamation Water Contract Deliveries: A Fifth Amendment Taking of 
Property?, 36 ENVTL. L. 1331, 1363–64 (2006); Brian E. Gray, The Property 
Right in Water, 9 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 4–9 (2002). 
 355. See supra notes 217–22 and accompanying text (discussing three pri-
mary challenges of water bankruptcy proceedings). 
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While some Californians have increasingly recognized the scarcity of 
water, not everyone has. The failure of plans for water management 
in the Delta to acknowledge scarcity has greatly hindered the ability 
of agencies to craft and implement water plans and policies that will 
be widely accepted. The management of Delta water by court deci-
sions reflects in part the lack of adequate water resource planning 
that takes scarcity into account.356
The declaration of insolvency would also help to set a tone 
of compromise. Despite the legislature’s rosy articulation of two 
co-equal goals,
  
357 the context of bankruptcy should dampen wa-
ter users’ expectations that everyone can emerge from the pro-
cess with more water. And yet, that was precisely the case dur-
ing the Bay-Delta negotiations. As the National Research 
Council (NRC) explained, the legislative treatment of water se-
curity and environmental enhancement as equal had the poten-
tial benefit of “forc[ing] planners to consider tradeoffs between 
water supply and environmental protection” and the educa-
tional advantage of “becom[ing] part of the public discourse 
about water.”358 But those advantages were not realized. In-
stead, in the words of the NRC, it appeared “to be assumed that 
additional water will have to be found to serve the co-equal 
goals.”359 This created an impossible situation, the report con-
tinued, in which, “[i]f the attainment of either or both goals re-
quires more water than is currently available, and additional 
water is unavailable because of scarcity, then the co-equal goals 
cannot be attained.”360
2. Rejecting Willful Ignorance 
 
However diligently California legislators and officials seek 
to address the deteriorating conditions of the Bay-Delta, their 
 
 356. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 32–33.  
 357. See ISENBERG, supra note 5. 
 358. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 34–35. 
 359. Id. at 36. The same unrealistic expectations plagued the earlier 
CALFED process. See Owen, supra note 343, at 1154–55 (describing CALFED 
managers’ belief that their job was to attempt to provide more water for con-
sumption). 
 360. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 35. As a coalition of envi-
ronmental, fishing, tribal, and environmental justice interests complained, the 
state’s approach was little more than “smoke and mirrors.” See Dan Bacher, 
Huge Coalition Presents Historic Recommendations to Delta Council, CENTRAL 
VALLEY (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2011/10/03/ 
18692002.php (“The Council simply can’t bring itself to define the ‘co-equal 
goals’ or acknowledge that, in an overappropriated watershed where protec-
tion of public trust resources requires more water, someone will have to make 
do with less water.” (quoting Bill Jennings, Executive Director, California 
Sportfishing Protection Alliance)).  
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efforts are vulnerable to misinterpretation—whether innocent 
or willful.361 In contrast to the optimism of the co-equal goals, 
the Bureau of Reclamation reports that there is an increasing 
gap in California between supply and demand.362 As of 2008, 
the Bureau documented statewide water demands ranging 
from 57.2 to 60.6 million acre-feet per year.363 At the same time, 
the Bureau measured statewide supply-demand gaps at some-
where between 2.3 and 4.3 million acre-feet annually, which 
represents “unmet urban, agricultural, and environmental de-
mands, along with the annual estimated amount of ground wa-
ter overdraft [as compared to] currently available supplies.”364 
By the year 2030, the Bureau projected that the supply-demand 
gap would increase to an estimated 4.9 million acre-feet per 
year (in average years) and 6.1 million acre-feet per year (in 
dry years).365 In some regions, the gap would greatly exceed 
statewide estimates.366
Beyond the unrealistic expectations spawned by the co-
equal goals, California has chosen willful water ignorance in 
several additional contexts. First, the state does not keep pre-
cise records of water use and water rights.
 
367
How can California’s water delivery system be made “more reliable” if 
we do not keep track of the full amount of existing water rights, and 
have no idea of the amount of water that might be required under 
[laws relating to the transfer of water from one watershed to anoth-
er]? If there are individuals and areas with a legal entitlement to a 
vast unknown and unknowable amount of water, . . . how can any wa-
 As Phil Isenberg, 
chair of the Delta Stewardship Council, asked rhetorically:  
 
 361. See generally Ellen Hanak et al., Myths of California Water: Implica-
tions and Reality, 16 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 3 (2010) (discuss-
ing common public misconceptions regarding California’s water system).  
 362. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, MID-PACIFIC REGION, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
INTERIOR, WATER SUPPLY AND YIELD STUDY 2–14 (2008) (discussing supply-
demand gaps), available at http://www.usbr.gov/mp/cvp/docs/Water%20Supply% 
20and%20Yield%20Study.pdf. 
 363. Id. at iv (representing the range demanded in a dry year and an aver-
age year). 
 364. Id. at iv–vi (representing the year 2000 gap, ranging from an average 
year to a dry year). 
 365. Id. at vi (as compared to a future statewide demand in 2030 estimated 
between 60.8 maf in average years and 57.4 maf in dry years). 
 366. Id.; see also ISENBERG, supra note 5, at 2 (“Our statewide water sup-
ply is under stress and that stress will continue. Our available water supply is 
increasingly volatile. . . . Climate change appears to be the main reason . . . .”); 
id. at 3 (“Our total water supply is relatively finite and has changed little in 
the last 30 years, while demand continues to grow. . . . We annually use more 
water than nature provides.”). 
 367. See Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 134, at 64. 
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ter system be truly reliable? . . . And to compound the problem, why 
do we refuse to keep careful track of who uses how much water, and 
for what?368
In addition to imprecise recordkeeping, California has no 
comprehensive permit system for the regulation of groundwa-
ter, even though groundwater accounts for about one-third of 
the state’s water usage.
 
369 Overlying landowners can freely 
withdraw the percolating groundwater (that is, groundwater 
that does not flow as an underground stream) beneath their 
property for reasonable and beneficial use.370 This right is sub-
ject only to the “correlative” right of other overlying landowners 
withdrawing from the same source.371 As one California court 
complained in 2006, “California is the only western state that 
still treats surface water and groundwater under separate and 
distinct legal regimes.”372 Rather than acknowledge the connec-
tion between surface and subsurface supplies, the court ex-
plained, California depends on water classifications “that bear 
little or no relationship to hydrological realities.”373
Applying the mechanics of water bankruptcy listed above
 
374 
would provide a catalyst for water agencies to develop a prac-
tice of collecting and reporting critical water data about water 
use and water rights in their jurisdiction. After declaring insol-
vency and convening a stakeholder group to discuss the realis-
tic goals watershed reorganization, debtor municipalities would 
be required to make a careful accounting of their debts and 
creditors before seeking the protection of bankruptcy—that is, 
they would list the water rights permitted in the relevant re-
gion, including details on the approved volumes, types, and 
places of use.375
 
 368. Isenbereg, supra note 4, at 8; see also Kevin M. O’Brien, Alice in 
Groundwater Land: Water Supply Assessments and Subsurface Water Sup-
plies, 4 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 131, 132 (2010) (“California’s long tradi-
tion of decentralized management—its ‘patchwork quilt’ of measurement, 
management and water rights administration . . . has been at odds with the 
Legislature’s efforts to inject precision and certainty into water supply and 
land use planning processes.”). 
 Likewise, water users would be prompted to 
 369. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 41. 
 370. See id. at 21. 
 371. See id. 
 372. North Gualala Water Co. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 43 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 821, 831 (Cal. App. 2006). 
 373. Id. See also CAL. WATER CODE § 10920 (West 2009) (calling for 
groundwater reform, but requiring only the monitoring and reporting of 
groundwater elevations). 
 374. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 375. See supra note 244 and accompanying text. 
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provide detailed “proofs of claim”376 to substantiate their actual 
historic consumptive use. In cases where the demonstrated use 
fell short of the face value of water rights, the difference would 
be subject to abandonment under traditional principles of wa-
ter law.377 Further, bankruptcy law contains explicit penalties 
for those who withhold information, which would provide an 
antidote for water users’ temptation to overstate the volumes of 
their water rights.378
3. Accommodating Modern Values 
 
After debts and claims have been substantiated, the insol-
vent water agency must come up with a plan for the distribu-
tion of assets that is acceptable to the creditors.379 This provides 
a critical opportunity and challenge for the parties to agree how 
much water should be dedicated to modern values such as envi-
ronmental preservation, aesthetic enjoyment, and recreation. 
As the Chairman of the Delta Stewardship Council explained, 
“Our water supply and the ways we use water, and the ecosys-
tem we protect or damage are deeply interconnected. . . . And, 
as we have learned over the past 50 years, our desire to have a 
modern, developed society rests on how it prizes and protects 
its natural environment and a reliable supply of water.”380 
Many recognize that ecosystem collapse can lead to water-
supply collapse. But, because society came to appreciate envi-
ronmental values long after the most senior water rights had 
been appropriated for domestic, irrigation, and other tradition-
al uses, environmental water rights (such as instream flows or 
minimum stream flows) receive only limited protection under 
principles of water law.381
 
 376. See supra notes 
  
272–75 and accompanying text. 
 377. See supra notes 172–77 and accompanying text. 
 378. See FED. R. OF BANKR. P. 3001(c)(2)(D) (if a claimant fails to provide 
required information, a court may “preclude the holder from presenting the 
omitted information” and/or “award other appropriate relief, including reason-
able expenses and attorney’s fees caused by the failure”); see also supra note 
173 and accompanying text (discussing the perverse incentive to overstate wa-
ter rights created by the abandonment doctrine). 
 379. See supra notes 278–86 and accompanying text. 
 380. See ISENBERG, supra note 5, at 2. 
 381. See generally Browning, supra note 286, at 9–10 (discussing instream 
flow water rights). Although environmental water rights tend to hold junior 
priorities, some states have developed mechanisms to provide them with more 
security. See id. at 9–12 (discussing Colorado’s instream flow program, which 
authorizes specified entities to acquire existing senior water rights by pur-
chase, donation, or other means, to change the use of the senior rights to 
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The bankruptcy model forces municipalities to confront 
such difficult issues directly as they develop and negotiate 
plans to reorganize their debts.382 Among other things, stake-
holders must agree whether environmental “debts” should be 
treated as secured or unsecured, senior or junior, and whether 
or not they rise to the level of preference.383
  CONCLUSION   
 
Take one world already being exhausted by 6 billion people. Find the 
ingredients to feed another 2 billion people. Add demand for more 
food, more animal feed and more fuel. Use only the same amount of 
water the planet has had since creation. And don’t forget to restore 
the environment that sustains us. Stir very carefully.384
The prior appropriation doctrine juxtaposes two of the 
law’s most cherished values—stability and evolution in light of 
changed circumstances. Increasingly, these values clash as wa-
tersheds become overappropriated. By definition, in watersheds 
that suffer from overappropriation, some users at the end of the 
line will face dashed hopes, defeated expectations, and no wa-
ter. Such disappointment may prompt users to cling ever more 
tightly to their “rights,” relying on their paper water permits as 
proof of their actual entitlements. Understandably, they will 
jealously guard their allotments against new water demands, 
such as those posed by the protection of endangered species and 
environmental preservation. At the same time, administrators 
will face pressure to make hard decisions and to strictly con-
strue existing rights in accordance with the principles of bene-
ficial use and non-waste. 
 
Eventually, the impasse among water users, administra-
tors, and federal wildlife agencies may become so great that it 
brings all interested parties to the bargaining table. Historical-
ly, such efforts at compromise have been hampered by the all-
or-nothing, first-come-first-served, inflexible culture spawned 
by the appropriation doctrine. Increasingly, bowing to reality, 
users may bargain for more security, but less water. But under 
the current ad-hoc bargaining framework, they likely leave the 
table with the bitter feeling that they have been cheated of 
 
instream flow purposes, and to retain the acquired rights’ original senior pri-
ority dates). 
 382. See supra note 238 and accompanying text. 
 383. See supra notes 246–54 and accompanying text. 
 384. WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, supra note 7 (quoting Margaret Catley-
Carlson, Patron Global Water Partnership, 2008–2009 Chair of World Eco-
nomic Forum Global Agenda Council on Water Security). 
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their rights, and that priority’s principles have given way to 
something resembling riparianism’s contrary ethic of sharing. 
This Article introduces the new concept of water bankrupt-
cy to help water agencies confront the realities of overallocation 
in the context of voluntary, stakeholder negotiations. By draw-
ing an analogy to time-honored principles honed in desperate 
circumstances, this Article hopes to show that negotiation and 
sharing are well-recognized responses to shortage—whether it 
goes under the name of insolvency or overappropriation. Fur-
ther, this Article highlights many principles of bankruptcy that 
will be surprisingly familiar to western water users. Hopefully, 
such bankruptcy-derived principles can provide guidance and 
comfort to numerous water-stakeholder groups and help them 
realize that their watershed shares the goals of insolvent debt-
ors—a fresh start and a negotiated reorganization plan that 
can endure for many years to come.  
 
